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The period from 1935 to 1945 has been widely recognized as a
turning point for the Supreme Court and for constitutional law in
general.' Of all the changes that occurred during this period, per-
haps none has had a more significant effect than the Court's explicit
recognition that racial, religious, and ethnic minorities should be
accorded a special degree of judicial protection. Footnote four of
United States v. Carolene Products,2 undoubtedly the best known
expression of the tilt in favor of minority protection,3 was only one
articulation of the new judicial concern.
That the Court's attitude towards both civil rights and minorities
changed during this period is beyond question.4 Although the term
"minorities" had some jurisprudential currency prior to the late 1930s,
to the majority of the Court it signified economic or regional minori-
ties rather than racial, religious, or ethnic groups.5 In several cases
during the period immediately after World War One, the Court struck
down oppressive measures directed against members of ethnic and re-
ligious groups. The decisions, however, were based upon individual
liberties under the Fourteenth Amendment, not upon the rights of
minority groups. Similarly, the Court provided a measure of protec-
tion to blacks under specific constitutional guarantees, 7 including the
right to counsel,8 the right to a fairly selected jury,9 and the right to
1. See generally C. PRmcHrr, THE ROOSEVELT COURT (1948); 2 W. SWINDLR, COURT
AND CoNsrrrTrToN IN TH TwNTEm CENTURY 101-56 (1970).
2. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
3. Appreciation of the significance of footnote four as a benchmark of modem con-
stitutional law is still developing. Compare J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DIrRusT 76 (1980)
(despite its influence, footnote has not been adequately elaborated) and Cover, The
Origins of Judicial Activism in the Protection of Minorities, in THE ROLE OF THE Ju-
DICIARY IN AMRICA (W. Moore ed. 1981) (forthcoming) (footnote four "first major articu-
lation" by Court of "dichotomous nature of judicial review') with Hamilton & Braden,
The Special Competence of the Supreme Court, 50 YALE LJ. 1319, 1354 (1941) (footnote
four only one of several competing theories justifying judicial protection of civil rights).
4. See L. LusKY, BY WHAT RiGHT? 97-123 (1975); A., MAsoN, THE SUPREME COURT:
PALLADIUM OF FREEDOM 150-56, 170-71 (1962); Ball, Judicial Protection of Powerless Mi-
norities, 59 IOWA L. Rav. 1059, 1060 & n.4 (1974); Cover, supra note 3; cf. Note, The
Negro Citizen in the Supreme Court, 52 HARv. L. REv. 823, 832 (1939) (noting contem-
porary trend by Court to use power to aid fight for racial equality).
5. Cover, supra note 3.
6. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (right to send children
to sectarian schools); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400-02 (1923) (right to teach for-
eign languages in public schools).
7. See Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917) (racially exclusive residential ordinance
held unconstitutional as violation of right of white vendor to dispose of property); Guinn
v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915) (literacy test combined with grandfather clause
violates Fifteenth Amendment).
8. Powell v. Alabama, 287 US. 45 (1932) (right to counsel in capital case).
9. Norris v. Alabama, 294 US. 587 (1935) (right of black suspect to grand and petit
jury from which blacks not systematically and arbitrarily excluded).
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a trial unimpeded by the threat of mob violence. 10 Yet in cases in which
the harm to minority group members violated no specific guarantee of
individual liberty, or in which the oppression was defended as an ex-
ercise of constitutionally protected liberty, the Court was decidedly
insensitive to minority claims.11
All of this began to change dramatically in the latter half of the
1930s. In a series of cases involving minorities in the modern sense,
the right to speak and the right to distribute literature were greatly
expanded. 12 Practices discriminating against blacks were successfully
challenged before the Court in the areas of criminal justice,13 elec-
tions,14 organized labor,15 transportation,' 6 and education. 17 Success-
ful challenges to practices previously upheld as exercises of individual
10. Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923).
11. See, e.g., Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935) (constitutional for party con-
vention to exclude blacks from voting in primary elections); Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S.
78 (1927) (constitutional to exclude Chinese child from white schools); Corrigan v. Buck-
ley, 271 U.S. 323 (1926) (racially restrictive housing covenants not state action).
The Court's perceived insensitivity to the status of blacks as a group was described by
Arthur Mitchell, a black Congressman from Chicago, in a statement explaining his sup-
port for Roosevelt's Court plan:
The Negroes have the least to lose [from the plan], because the courts have always
been ready to strike down every measure passed by Congress for the benefit of the
Negro, from the Dred Scott decision down to the present, including the Fourteenth
Amendment.
It is true that in the Scottsboro and Arkansas cases the Supreme Court has pro-
tected the rights of the individual, but whenever a question of the rights of the
masses comes up the Supreme Court has stood in the way as no other organization
has done.
N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 1937, § 1, at 2, col. 4.
12. Several decisions struck down state restrictions challenged by Jehovah's Witnesses.
West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (compulsory flag salute for
religious objectors); Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) (municipal ban on door-to-
door canvassing); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (license tax upon sale
of religious literature); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (license requirement
for persons soliciting religious contributions); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939)
(municipal ordinances restricting distribution of handbills in streets); Lovell v. Griffin,
303 U.S. 444 (1938) (prior licerising requirement for distributing literature); cf. Herndon
v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937) (reversing conviction of black communist agitator for at-
tempting to incite insurrection).
13. Several decisions reversed convictions because blacks had been unconstitutionally
excluded from grand and petit juries. Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940); Pierre v.
Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354 (1939); Hale v. Kentucky, 303 U.S. 613 (1938). Two other cases
overturned convictions of black suspects based on confessions coerced by torture. Chambers
v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
14. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (white primary); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S.
268 (1939) (discriminatory voter registration statute).
15. Railway Mail Ass'n v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88 (1945) (postal clerks); Tunstall v. Brother-
hood of Locomotive Firemen, 323 U.S. 210 (1944) (locomotive firemen); Steele v. Louis-
ville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944) (same).
16. Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 (1946) (passenger buses); Mitchell v. United
States, 313 U.S. 80 (1941) (railroads).
17. Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 US. 337 (1938) (law school).
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liberty, most notably restrictive covenants' 8 and white primaries,19
reflected the increased weight given to minority claims. These de-
cisions were significant not only for their holdings but also for their
rhetoric. Repeatedly, majority and dissenting opinions attached con-
stitutional significance to the minority status of the claimants.
20
The changes signaled by footnote four, and manifested by the oth-
er cases of the period, did not occur in isolation. Underlying the
shift, and influenced by domestic and foreign affairs in the 1930s, was
a changing perception of democracy and its weaknesses. As new mem-
bers were elevated to the Court and sitting Justices altered their think-
ing, the Court moved toward a new paradigm of tyranny, one in which
persecution of minorities by an unrestrained, intolerant majority posed
the major threat to democracy. This perspective had roots in a con-
temporary ideology that similarly stressed the vulnerability of democ-
racy to the exploitation of majority prejudice against minority groups.
This article examines the nature of the emerging ideology as ex-
pressed in popular and academic writings in the late 1930s, the man-
ner in which it influenced the thinking of members of the Supreme
Court, and the Court's opportunity to express its new understanding
in response to a new litigation strategy by the Justice Department.
These currents were exemplified in the vital area of election law, which
governs the core of the democratic political process. In particular, the
article examines the decision in United States v. Classic,21 an election
law case decided in 1941; Classic demonstrated the divergences of
method and approach among adherents of the new ideology and point-
ed toward further development of constitutional doctrine protecting
the rights of minorities.2
2
18. Compare Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) with Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S.
323 (1926).
19. Comptare Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) with Grovey v. Townsend, 295
U.s. 45 (1935).
20. Railway Mail Ass'n v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88, 94 (1945); Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R.,
323 U.S. 192, 198-201 (1944); id. at 209 (Murphy, J., concurring); Martin v. Struthers,
319 U.S. 141, 146 (1943); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115-16 (1943); Jones v.
Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 617 (1942) (Murphy, J., dissenting), vacated, 319 U.S. 103, 104
(1943); Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 604, 606 (1940) (Stone, J., dissent-
ing); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227,
236, 238 (1940). But see West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 US. 624, 646-47 (1943)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (minority status acknowledged but deemed irrelevant); Hem-
don v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 275-76 (1937) (Van Devanter, J., dissenting) (minority status
of black agitator and audience among circumstances relevant to finding probable insur-
rectionary effect of speech).
21. 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
22. The breadth of the subject and the limited range of source material leave this
account as a tentative exploration of one aspect of the Court's intellectual development
during this vital period.
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I. Minorities, Majorities, and a New Ideology
The dominant political thought of a generation, as Professor Robert
Cover has observed, often is organized around a particular paradigm
of tyranny.23 In general terms, two alternative paradigms have served
in political thought over the course of this nation's history to de-
scribe the greatest threats to the survival of democracy. One is the
threat of autocratic rule by an individual or elite. This view, vig-
orously expressed in the early part of this century by the populist
wing of the Progressive movement, 24 led to political reforms such as
the direct primary.2 5 The other conception perceives the prospect of
unrestrained majority rule as the Achilles heel of democracy. This
fear, articulated in varying forms from the Federalist Papers and de
Tocqueville to the present time,28 generated opposition to the Pro-
gressive reforms of initiative, referendum, and recall.
2 T
Both of these paradigms claimed adherents at the outset of the
1930s.2 8 The events of the ensuing decade provided evidence for each
school that democracy was seriously threatened, either by dictator-
ship or by mob rule. At the same time, however, the specific fears
of the two schools converged: autocratic dictatorship and unrestrained
majority rule were increasingly understood as facets of the same phe-
nomenon-emotionally based mass prejudice against unprotected mi-
norities. As a result, a degree of consensus emerged in the contem-
porary ideology of the period regarding the threat facing American
democracy.
A. The Tyranny of the Majority Revisited
The trauma, deprivation, and conflict of the 1930s shook the con-
fidence of Americans in the strength of unaided democracy as a
form of political organization.29 The course of events at home and
23. Cover, sutra note 3.
24. See R. HOFsTADTR, THE AGE OF REFORM 260-61, 264-65 (1956).
25. A. LovEJoY, LA FOLLETTE AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE DIRECT PRIMARY IN WIS-
CONSIN, 1890-1904, at 36, 57 (1941).
26. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (J. Madison); 1 A. DE TOCQUEviLLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA
22740 (J. Mayer & M. Lerner eds. 1966).
27. J. PASCHAL, MR. JUSTICE SUTHERLAND 73-80, 89-90 (1951); G. SUTHERLAND, THE
COURTS AND THE CONSTITUTION, S. Doc. No. 970, 62d Cong., 3d Sess. 3-4 (1912).
28. For example, the dangers of unrestrained majority rule had been stressed by
Walter Lippmann's analysis of democracy in a series of books published during the
mid-1920s. See p. 748 infra. On the other hand, progressives inveighed against the
influence of elite business interests upon governmental decisionmaking at the expense
of the people. H. WALLACE, NEW FRONTIERS 42-48 (1934).
29. E. PURCELL, THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY 126-28, 132 (1973); Rogers, Book
Review, 24 A.B.A.J. 934 (1938) (reviewing Rappard, The Crisis of Democracy).
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abroad raised questions about the ability of democratic government
to manage the nation's economic affairs and its ability to compete
with other forms of government.30 By the end of the decade, the very
survival of the democratic system was in doubt, and many observers
were calling for democracy to become "militant" in the face of con-
flict abroad and deprivation at home.81
It would be impossible to make a comprehensive survey of the re-
actions by politically active Americans to the events of the 1930s.
Nevertheless, the furor over President Roosevelt's 1937 proposal to
pack the Court32 provides a useful starting point for reviewing con-
temporary thinking about democracy. Whether the Court plan ag-
gravated existing fears or created new ones, 3 it focused popular at-
tention on the analyses of the weaknesses of democracy being advanced
by a number of significant contemporary observers.
The Court packing plan evoked objections rooted in both paradigms
of tyranny. The most widespread response to the plan was fear of dic-
tatorship in the traditional sense. Conservatives and liberals alike ac-
cused Roosevelt of harboring dictatorial ambitions and attempting
to subjugate the last independent branch of government.3 4 Even per-
sons who could not believe that Roosevelt himself was a potential
dictator expressed concern that the plan would allow a future fascist
President to assume control over the Court.3 5 Accordingly, the plan
provoked a barrage of statements defending the Court as a bulwark
30. M. HALU.REN, SEEDS OF REVOLT 278-87 (1935); W. LEUCHTENBURG, FRANKIN D.
ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW DEAL, 1932-1940, at 275-76 (1963); R. STEEL, WALTER LInPMANN
AND THE AMERICAN CENTURY 299 (1980).
31. See, e.g., M. LERNER, IT Is LATER THAN You THINK 101-04 (1939); Loewenstein,
Militant Democracy and Fundamental Rights, 1, 31 AM. POLITICAL Sci. REv. 417, 422-23,
430-32 (1937); Mowrer, Minorities of Opinion, 28 SURVEY GRAPHIC 83, 189-90 (1939); cf.
IV. DOuGLAs, Our Changing World, in DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE 1, 2 (1940) (contending
that to compete effectively, democratic government must be "mobile, bold, and intelli-
gent); A. EKIRCH, IDEOLOGIES AND UT PiAS 238-43 (1969) (discussing shift by some intel-
lectuals toward active defense of democracy); E. PURCELL, supra note 29, at 138 (describ-
ing growing appeal in late 1930s for reaffirmation and deeper understanding of demo.
cratic principles).
32. See J. Asor & T. CATLEDGE, THE 168 DAYS (1938); L. BAKER, BACK TO BACK (1967);
R. JACKSON, THE STmUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 176-96 (1941); A. MASON, HARuAN
FISKE STONE 437-64 (1956).
33. Although many conservatives needed no further proof of Roosevelt's dictatorial
aims, see G. WoLrsKiLL & J. HuDsoN, ALL BUT THE PEOPLE 153-56 (1969), the plan did
push into open opposition a number of left-wing and moderate intellectuals who had
been uneasy about Roosevelt's personality and about the paternalism of the New Deal.
A. EKIRCH, supra note 31, at 195-205.
34. See generally L. BAKER, suf'ra note 32, at 97-99; R. STEEL, supra note 30, at 320;
G. WoLFsKiLL & J. HUDSON, supra note 33, at 261-63.
35. See, eg., L. BAKER, supra note 32, at 47-49; Krock, One Unanswered Argument
Against Court Plan, N.Y. Times, Feb. 23, 1937, § 1, at 26, col. 5.
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against takeover by an autocratic and oppressive Chief Executive.38
The plan also prompted more elaborate and sophisticated criti-
cisms from proponents of a different view of democracy. Perhaps
the most influential of these critics, because of the wide syndication
of his column and his eminence as a commentator, was Walter
Lippmann.37 Over the preceding decade Lippmann's early Progressiv-
ism had been replaced by growing mistrust of majority rule.38 Lipp-
mann contended that only an educated elite, not the masses, possessed
the knowledge and ability to govern a modem state. Democracy was
a useful mechanism for the peaceful adjustment of conflicts between
groups, thereby maintaining social stability and popular allegiance
to the government; 39 this function was threatened by unrestrained
majority rule. The key to liberty, therefore, was to dissolve the im-
pact of majorities.40 The events of the 1930s provided Lippmann with
concrete illustrations for his analysis. To Lippmann, the popularity
of autocratic figures such as Huey Long 1 demonstrated that democra-
cy could be overthrown if a dictator obtained the support of a ma-
jority.42 The growth of fascism in Europe similarly demonstrated
how groups could exploit the rights of free speech and assembly in
order to obtain a mandate from the majority to discard democracy
and establish a totalitarian regime.48
The Court plan gave Lippmann the occasion to bring his analysis
of democracy to bear on a highly controversial issue.44 Majority rule
unrestrained by the Court, he argued, would pose a grave danger
to free government. Lippmann echoed the popular clamor over the
36. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1937, § 1, at 3, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1937,
§ 1, at 3, col. 4; N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1937, § 1, at 32, col. 4.
37. A. EKiRCH, supra note 31, at 200; R. STEEL, supra note 30, at 280-81, 319-21.
38. See R. STEEL, supra note 30, at 211-20, 226-27. Lippmann's change of heart was
not unique. See 3 V. PARRINGTON, MAIN CURRENTS IN AMEIuCAN THOUGHT 401-13 (1930)
(emergence of liberal disillusionment with democratic principles after World War One).
39. W. LIPPMANN, THE PHANTOM PUBLIC 38-53, 58-62 (1925); R. STEEL, supra note
30, at 212-15, 218.
40. W. LIPPMANN, AMERICAN INQUISITORS 110-11 (1928); R. STEEL, supra note 30, at 219.
41. Huey Long, Governor of Louisiana and then United States Senator, developed a
political machine whose strength was based not only on mass popular appeal but on
totalitarian control over the electoral process, the police, the legislature, and the ju-
diciary. See T. WILLIAMS, HUEtY LONG 4-8 (1969). Long's "Share Our Wealth" program
rapidly gained popular support across the nation in 1935. Id. at 696-701. Long's popular
appeal is discussed in R. SWING, FORERUNNERS OF AMERICAN FASCISM 62-107 (1935).
42. Lippmann, Today and Tomorrow, N.Y. Herald Tribune, Feb. 5, 1935, § 1, at 19,
col. 1.
43. Lippmann, Constitutional Checks and Balances, L.A. Times, Apr. 27, 1937, § II,
at 4, col. 5.
44. See R. STEEL, suPra note 30, at 519 (Lippmann wrote 37 columns on issue during
five months of Court packing controversy).
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dictatorial threat posed by unrestrained executive power,45 but con-
tended that the real significance of the plan was rooted in the central
political problem of modem democracy, the tendency of the majority
to abdicate to dictatorship.
[T]he problem of the future is not what it was when English-
men set out to restrain their king. The problem of the future is
to enable the awakening masses, who have all the ultimate power,
to govern themselves without being driven by their own inexperi-
ence and their own passing hysterias into disaster and the suicide
of democracy.46
The susceptibility of majorities to manipulation by dictators, Lipp-
mann argued, was heightened by another distinction between tyranny
in 1789 and in 1937: the Founding Fathers "had not seen the new
demagoguery based on the radio and the press and other modem
instruments of propaganda."' 7 The messianic personal government ex-
emplified by Roosevelt4" and Long' 9 indicated the potential for ma-
nipulation of the majority.
The independence of the judiciary, Lippmann contended, was the
"vital center" of constitutional democracy and the bulwark against
usurpation by a "transient and hysterical majority."50 First, the ju-
diciary had the power to protect civil liberties and thus allow an "in-
formed popular will" to prevail over the "ignorant whims of the
moment." Judicial protection of the political process from legislative
interference would help ensure that the majority of the moment would
not be manipulated into permanently eradicating the process."1 Sec-
ond, the Court served as counterweight to the inevitable growth of
governmental power over the economy. Lippmann conceded the ne-
cessity of broad governmental control over the economy and argued for
a double standard of judicial review that would enable the govern-
45. Lippmann, Today and Tomorrow, N.Y. Herald Tribune, Feb. 9, 1937, § 1, at
21, col. 1.
46. Lippmann, supra note 43.
47. Lippmann, Today and Tomorrow, N.Y. Herald Tribune, Feb. 17, 1937, § 1, at
23, col. 1.
48. Lippmann, Today and Tomorrow, N.Y. Herald Tribune, June 26, 1937, § 1, at
13, col. 1. Lippmann discerned ominous implications in Roosevelt's willingness to use
any means to achieve his ends. Id. He predicted that Roosevelt would somehow "muzzle"
the independence of the press because it represented the last remaining obstacle to con-
solidation of his "new and vast" power. Id. col. 2.
49. Lippmann, Today and Tomorrow, N.Y. Herald Tribune, Feb. 17, 1937, § 1, at
23, col. 1.
50. Lippmann, Today and Tomorrow, N.Y. Herald Tribune, Feb. 9, 1937, § 1, at 21,
cols. 1, 2.
51. Lippmann, supra note 43.
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ment to deal with the economy but prevent it from suppressing civil
liberties.52 Nevertheless, he argued that it was necessary to assure to
individuals and minorities the right to invoke judicial scrutiny of op-
pressive governmental regulations in the economic sphere. 3 In both
roles, the Court served to moderate what Lippmann perceived to be
the central conflict of democracy-the majority versus the minority
or individual.
Lippmann's analysis of the weakness of democracy was shared in
large part by another well-known syndicated columnist, Dorothy
Thompson. She agreed that the greatest danger to democracy lay
in the possibility that the majority, in its desire to obtain order and
security, would abdicate in favor of personal leadership and authori-
tarian government. 4 Thompson based her concern on her personal
observations of the collapse of constitutional democracy in Europe.
She acknowledged that a similar collapse was not imminent in the
United States,55 but argued that the Court plan threatened one of
the guarantees against such a scenario.
[T]he prevention against a democracy running away with itself,
the prevention against a powerful majority riding roughshod over
the temporary minority and selling short the whole future of the
country, the prevention against today's majority mortgaging to-
morrow's majority, lay in a written constitution and an indepen-
dent Supreme Court to interpret that Constitution. 6
Precedent for executive usurpation of the judiciary could be found,
she argued, in Huey Long's takeover of the Louisiana Supreme Court
in order to nullify any possible judicial resistance to his actions.5 7
The need to restrain majority rule and to protect minorities and
individuals was also stressed by other critics of the Court plan. For-
mer President Hoover, in a speech opposing the plan, defended the
Court as the sanctuary of the "humblest citizen and the weakest mi-
52. Lippmann, Today and Tomorrow, N.Y. Herald Tribune, Feb. 16, 1937, § 1, at
19, cols. 1-2.
53. R. STEEL, suPra note 30, at 323-24; Lippmann, Today and Tomorrow, L.A. Times,
July 27, 1937, § II, at 4, col. 6.
54. Reorganization of the Federal judiciary: Hearings on S. 1392 Before the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 75th Cong., Ist Sess. 866-67 (1937) (statement of Dorothy Thomp-
son) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings]. Thompson's analysis was frequently set forth
in her books and syndicated columns. See, e.g., D. THOMPSON, LET THE RECoRD SPEAK
279 (1939) [hereinafter cited as THoMPsoN-REcORD]; D. THOMPSON, DOROTHY THOmPSON'S
PoLITIcAL GUIDE 53-56, 72-73 (1938).
55. Senate Hearings, supra note 54, at 866.
56. Id. at 860.
57. Id. at 867-68.
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nority" and noted that liberty was crumbling in the world as nations
committed suicide under "persuaders" who professed to be acting in
the name of the people. 8 Frederic Coudert, a prominent New York
lawyer, stated that the Court was the ultimate defender of fundamen-
tal rights against the temporary legislation of passing majorities act-
ing under "the pressure of a rapidly changing and sometimes hys-
terical public opinion." 59
The dangers of unrestrained majority rule were recognized not only
by opponents but also by many proponents of the Court plan. If the
Supreme Court continued to prevent the government from taking
the necessary steps to alleviate the economic crisis, New Dealers ar-
gued, it would precipitate the abdication of the electorate in favor
of efficient totalitarianism. 60 Permitting the New Deal to go forward
was necessary in order to outflank authoritarians armed with social
welfare programs.61 Attorney General Homer Cummings expressed
this view in 1938 when he advocated raising democracy to its "highest
working efficiency" so that "the waters of discontent and the floods
of alien propaganda will beat against it in vain. ' 62 He also recog-
nized the importance of the Court's role in protecting the political
process and safeguarding civil liberties.63
58. N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1937, § 1, at 23, col. 1.
59. N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1937, § 1, at 33, col. 1.
60. R. JACKSON, suPra note 32, at xv; MacLeish, Foreword to F. FRANKFURTER, LAW
AND PoLrics at ix, xv, xxiii (1939); N.Y. Times, Mar. 5, 1937, § 1, at I, col. 6, & 14, cols.
2-3 (speech by Roosevelt).
61. See generally A. SCHLESINGER, THE POLITICS OF UPHEAVAL 15-207 (1960) (discussion
of Coughlin, Long, fascist sympathizers, left-wing radicals, and other political figures
appealing to popular discontent).
62. SELECTED PAPERS OF HOMER CUMMINGS 303 (C. Swisher ed. 1939). Earlier writers
commenting on the rise of "proto-fascists" such as Huey Long, see note 41 supra, and
Father Coughlin, see note 99 infra, had expressed similar concerns. In a popular novel
published in 1935, It Can't Happen Here, Thompson's husband, Sinclair Lewis, depicted
the collapse of democracy as the electorate voted into office a dictatorial figure similar
to Huey Long. He attributed this collapse to the popular desire to satisfy an obsessive
materialism at the price of continued democracy. Lewis' scenario was given wide exposure.
Beginning in December 1936, twenty-one dramatic productions of a stage version of the
novel were produced across the country by the WPA's Federal Theatre. A. EKIRCH, supra
note 31, at 160.
Raymond Gram Swing of The Nation analyzed the appeal of persons such as Long
and Coughlin as the result of popular economic despair. Democratic government, he
concluded, would have to deal effectively with the economy or it would lose the alle-
giance of the populace. R. SWING, supra note 41, at 22-23; Swing, The Build-up of Long
and Coughlin, 140 NATION 325, 325-26 (1935). Swing's analysis was corroborated by the
reflection of one disciple of Huey Long: "If dictatorship in Louisiana, such as was
charged to Huey Long, will give to the people of our nation what it gave to the people
of my native state, then I am for such a dictatorship." A. SINDLER, HUEY LONG'S LOUISIANA
115 (1956).
63. SELECTED PAERs or HOMER CUMMINGS, supra note 62, at 305.
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Whether they accepted or opposed Roosevelt's Court plan, many
influential commentators in 1937 and 1938 agreed that the majority
might constitute a significant political threat to the continuation of
a democratic system.64 The proponents of the plan perceived the dan-
ger in the frustration of majority desires, especially in the economic
sphere; their reasoning supported restrictions upon the Court's powers.
Opponents of the plan, on the other hand, emphasized the perils of
indulging the will of the majority, which could be manipulated by
charismatic political leaders.
In the wake of the Court plan, the Court retreated from its eco-
nomic interventionism. 5 At the same time, the need to limit the
majority will in dealing with minorities was emphasized by events in
Europe and by parallels that could be drawn to the oppression of
minorities in the United States.
B. Group Conflict and Unrestrained Majoritarianism
During the Court fight, a number of opponents of the plan de-
fended the Court as the protector of victimized minority groups.
They expressed concern about the tendency toward racial, religious,
and'ethnic oppression in the United States, a theme that would be-
come more insistent as the decade drew to a close. Senator Burton
Wheeler of Montana recalled that the federal courts had provided
the only resistance to nativist hysteria during World War One, and
he warned against tampering with the Court because "there might
be another hysteria sweeping the country."601 The courts, Senator Royal
Copeland of New York argued repeatedly, were the "sole protection
of our people against political terrorism, religious bigotry, racial per-
secution and economic tyranny."8 7 Massachusetts Senator David Walsh,
64. Concerns about the dangers of fascism and demagoguery were not always expressed
in terms of the new paradigm focusing on the dangers of unrestrained majoritarianism.
Socialist Max Lerner, editor of The Nation, believed that men like Long, Coughlin, and
Jersey City Mayor Frank Hague, who strove "to outdo each other in promises," were
the individuals most dangerous to democracy. M. LERNER, supra note 31, at 110. He viewed
these men, however, as mercenaries of the plutocracy. Fascist takeovers, in Lerner's view,
were the result of suppression of the civil liberties of the majority by propertied minor-
ities, rather than of the manipulation of majority sentiment. He characterized fascism
as the rule of force and wrote that the majority was relegated to the ratification of faits
accomplis in engineered plebiscites. Id. at 108. Yet even Lerner wrote of the "surrender"
of men to the perceived efficiency of fascism and the exploitation of scapegoats to
mobilize popular support for fascist takeovers. Id. at 36-43.
65. See C. PRITCHET, supra note 1, at 71-90.
66. L. BAKER, supra note 32, at 81.
67. N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1937, § 1, at 24, col. 1; see N.Y. Times, Mar. 13, 1937, § 1,
at 10, col. 1.
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speaking at Carnegie Hall, asserted that the Court's decisions in Meyer
v. Nebraska8 and Pierce v. Society of Sisters9 had prevented a hys-
terical majority from persecuting a minority on ethnic and religious
grounds. "Without an independent judiciary," he continued, "I hesi-
tate to even think of denials to minorities of constitutional guaran-
tees if some of the doctrines preached by groups in this country to-
day should be suddenly enacted into law. ' 70 In a radio speech, con-
servative publisher Frank Gannett described the opposition of his
barber to the Court plan: "'I am a Jew, and therefore one of a mi-
nority. I realize that if it were not for the Supreme Court, I might
be treated here as they treat the Jews in Germany!'" Gannett con-
tinued, "[M]embers of the colored race must feel the same, for the
Supreme Court again and again has protected the rights of colored
people." 71 Others similarly emphasized the need for an independent
Court to protect the rights of minorities, particularly religious mi-
norities.
72
In the years following the struggle over the Court plan, events
in Europe attracted increasing attention in the United States73 and
contributed to a growing understanding of the exploitation of ir-
rational, emotional forces by European fascist movements. The Eu-
ropean example showed that majority tyranny and group hatred were
closely related, and that majorities could be induced to give up
democracy not only by appeals to their economic desires, but also
by the conscious exploitation of their racial and religious animos-
ities.7 4
68. 262 US. 390 (1923).
69. 268 US. 510 (1925).
70. N.Y. Times, Mar. 13, 1937, § 1, at 10, col. 6.
71. L. BAKER, sukra note 32, at 80-81; see N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 1937, § 1, at 6, col. 3
(reporting Gannett speech).
72. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1937, § I, at 23, col. I (Herbert Hoover); N.Y. Times,
Feb. 11, 1937, § 1, at 16, col. 3 (Bishop Manning).
73. Hitler's annexation of Austria in March 1938 was followed by large-scale violence
and brutality against Jews. In November 1938, the Nazi regime responded to the assas-
sination of a minor German official by a Polish Jew by unleashing a wave of arson,
looting, and murder, known as "the night of broken glass," or Kristallnacht. These
events were widely reported in American newspapers. See A. MORSE, WHILE SIX MILLION
DIWv 199-201, 221-28 (1967). In addition, Americans, particularly those in university cir-
cles, were reminded of the events in Europe by a small influx of refugees, who included
many of Europe's foremost scholars and artists. See M. DAVIE, REFUGEES IN AMERICA 1-46
(1947); L. FERMI, ILLuSrRious IMMIGRANTs 4-135 (1968).
74. A symposium on the issues of socialism, fascism, and democracy sponsored by the
American Academy for the Advancement of Science in 1935 focused on economic issues
and included relatively little discussion of minorities and group hatred. See 180 ANNALS
1-182 (1935). But cf. Odum, Orderly Transitional Democracy, 180 ANNALS 31, 37-38 (1935)
(danger of "mass social pathology"); Ward, The Development of Fascism in the United
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Academic and popular observers stressed that fascism, much like
Lippmann's version of democracy gone berserk, was the revolution
of the "irrational masses" 75 and the "institutionaliz[ing]" of the mob.70
National Socialism demonstrated, wrote one commentator, the inti-
mate connection between "the extreme forms of mob rule and the
extreme forms of autocratic tyranny."' 7 Professor Karl Loewenstein
of Amherst, himself a German refugee, described the essential fea-
ture of fascism as the "supersession of constitutional government by
emotional government." He explained, "[T]he cohesive strength of
the dictatorial and authoritarian state is rooted in emotionalism."78
"In brief, to arouse, to guide, and to use emotionalism in its crudest
and its most refined forms is the essence of the fascist technique for
which movement and emotion are not only linguistically identical." 79
Dorothy Thompson, who had earlier stressed the economic and na-
tionalistic impulses that led majorities into dictatorship, began to em-
phasize the irrational aspects of fascism. Hitler, she wrote in 1938,
"has a strong sense of the dark, emotional forces in men."8' 0 She as-
serted that the new totalitarian states, "mass states, directed by mass
organization and mass propaganda and enjoying mass support," rep-
resented the revolution of the twentieth century.8' Others echoed
this view of fascism as the stimulation of emotions to a fever pitch
by charismatic leaders.8 2
The perception that fascist government rested upon emotional
manipulation helped American observers to account for the degra-
dation of minorities, particularly Jews, under fascist regimes. Rac-
ism, the source of Hitler's "charismatic power,"8 3 was recognized
as one of the principal cohesive tools used by the fascists to main-
tain the hysteria necessary to sustain their power. Some scholars as-
States, 180 ANNALS 55, 55-56 (1935) (racial hatred of Negroes more dangerous than anti-
Semitism). In contrast, a special issue of Survey Graphic in 1939 concentrated on the
plight of victimized minority groups, especially the Jews, under Nazi rule. 28 SURVEY
GRAPHIC 49-192 (1939); see note 93 infra.
75. S. NEUMANN, PERMANENT RVOLUTION 96-117 (1942).
76. E. FREEMAN, CONQUERING THE MAN IN THE STREET 302 (1940). See generally E.
LEDERER, STATE OF THE MASSES (1940) (analyzing modem dictatorship's reliance on "insti-
tutionalized masses').
77. F. BORKENAU, THE TOTALITARIAN ENEMY 151 (1940).
78. Loewenstein, supra note 31, at 418.
79. Id. at 423.
80. THOMPSON-RECORD, supra note 54, at 241 (based on column dated Oct. 17, 1938).
81. Id. at 245 (based on speech delivered Oct. 27, 1938).
82. See, e.g., F. NEUMANN, BEHEMOTH 83, 95-98 (1942); M. RADER, NO COMPROMISE
16-18, 20-26, 32-33, 41 (1939); F. SCHUMAN, THE NAzI DICTATOSHIP 78-84, 91-94 (2d ed.
1936).
83. F. NEUMANN, supra note 82, at 98.
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serted that the persecution of minorities arose primarily from the
need to create scapegoats, 84 while others explained it as a byproduct
of the Nazis' elevation of race to the central organizing principle of
society.8 5 But most agreed that the persecution of minorities was in-
tegrally related to the survival of the European fascist states; as one
author put it, anti-Semitism was not only the "outstanding charac-
teristic" of Nazism, but expressed "better and more pronouncedly
than any other feature the inner dynamics and the inner logic of
the totalitarian revolution."80 Persecution of minorities, wrote Pro-
fessor Sigmund Neumann of Wesleyan, was the "cornerstone" of the
new order in fascist countries.
8 7
Many writers understood that the phenbmenon of minority perse-
cution was not unique to the fascist countries. Professor Frederick
Schuman, in his classic study of Nazism, described the persecution
of minorities as one of the "most ancient, most direct, and most
immediately efficacious" devices available to ruling classes seeking
to maintain control, because it deflected unrest toward a helpless mi-
nority and because the entire community could participate in the per-
secution.8 Historian Jacques Barzun, concerned about Nazi ideology,
undertook a study of racism in 1937 and concluded that it was a
tool for rallying "scattered forces behind something simple and ob-
vious."89 Anthropologist Ruth Benedict, writing in 1940, examined
the history and nature of racism in an effort to answer the question,
"Why is there an epidemic of racism in the world today?" 90 Although
racism itself was a creation of the modern world, she explained, it
was nevertheless another instance of the age-old phenomenon of the
suppression and persecution of minorities-the "out-group." 91 Journal-
84. See, e.g., E. FREEMAN, supra note 76, at 73-78; M. LERNR, supra note 31, at 38,
42-43; S. RAUSHENBUSH, THE MARCH OF FAsCISM 41, 104 (1939); F. SCHUMAN, supra note
82, at 112-13, 312-27; THOMPSON-REcoRD, supra note 54, at 248 (based on speech deliv-
ered Oct. 27, 1938); Janowsky, Minorities: Pawns of Power, 28 SURVEY GRAPHIC 76, 163-64
(1939); Miller, Introduction to D. STRONG, ORGANIzED ANTI-SEMITISM IN AMERICA at i
(2d ed. 1941).
85. See, e.g., F. NEUMANN, supra note 82, at 98-127; M. RADER, supra note 82, at 102-
03; F. SCHUMAN, supra note 82, at 113-15.
86. P. DRUCKER, THE END OF ECONOMIC MAN 198-99 (1939).
87. S. NEUMANN, supra note 75, at 299.
88. F. SCHUMAN, supra note 82, at 312-13.
89. J. BARZUN, RACE: A STUDY IN MODERN SUPERSTITION 250 (1937).
90. R. BENEDICT, RACE: SCIENCE AND PoLics at vi (1940).
91. Id. at 220-56. In the same vein, the Executive Council of the Society for the Psy-
chological Study of Social Issues released a statement at the 1938 Annual Meeting of
the American Psychological Association denouncing the increase in racism in Europe
and in the United States, and explained it as a manifestation of the "well-known psy-
chological tendency" for "people to blame others for their own misfortunes." Id. at 261-63.
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ist Raymond Gram Swing, reflecting upon the "hell" that Europe
had become for minorities, echoed Lippmann in arguing that the
problem of the twentieth century was "that of majorities learning
to give minorities and individuals the rights that are inherently
theirs."9 2 A special 1939 issue of Survey Graphic, edited by Swing
and devoted to the dangers that fascism posed to the United States, con-
tained several articles focusing upon the persecution of racial and
religious minorities in Europe. 3
The belief that the contemporary European experience exemplified
the general plight of minorities everywhere9 4 invited unflattering com-
parison of the situation of blacks in the United States with that of
minorities in Europe. Several observers specifically compared the de-
spised position of Jews in Germany to that of blacks in this country.95
Others argued that the uninhibited violence directed against Ger-
many's Jews was fundamentally similar to the lynchings and beat-
ings of blacks in the United States. 6 As Swing noted, the "tyranny"
and "persecution" for which Europe was being denounced were "du-
plicated" on a smaller scale in this country.9 7
In addition, the sobering experiences of European countries height-
ened Americans' sensitivity to the deliberate stimulation of group
prejudice in the United States. As one observer wrote, "[o]ne of the
most oppressive similarities between ourselves and pre-Hitler Ger-
many is the growth of a campaign of racial intolerance."98 Commen-
tators looked with alarm upon the increasingly violent anti-Semitism
of Father Coughlin,"9 whose statements drew upon the themes of
92. Swing, Over Here, 28 SURVEY GRAPHIC 55, 61 (1939). In contrast, according to his
biographer, Lippmann, for personal as well as intellectual reasons, was never able truly
to grasp the emotional or racist appeal of fascism. R. STEEL, supra note 30, at 323, 326.
But see id. at 330 (Lippmann recognized persecution of Jews as outlet for Nazi greed
and aggressiveness that protected Europe from war).
93. Calling America, 28 SURVEY GRAPHIC 49-192 (1939) (special issue). Contributors to
this issue included Felix Frankfurter, Bertrand Russell, Lewis Gannett, Dorothy Thomp-
son, Alpheus T. Mason, and Archibald MacLeish.
94. On the conceptualization of a "minorities" problem cutting across the experiences
of particular minority groups, see Cover, supra note 3.
95. R. BENEDICr, supra note 90, at 242; F. SCHUMAN, supra note 82, at 324; Gannett,
We're Another, 28 SuRVEY GRAPHIC 109, 109-12 (1939).
96. E. FREEMAN, supra note 76, at 292-95; M. LERNER, supra note 31, at 42; M. RADR,
suPra note 82, at 100, 145; F. SCHUMAN, supra note 82, at 313.
97. Swing, supra note 92, at 60.
98. S. RAUSHENBUSH, supra note 84, at 11.
99. From 1926 to 1940, Father Charles Coughlin, a Catholic priest, broadcast a popular
radio show with millions of listeners. During the first half of the 1930s, he was an
ardent supporter of Roosevelt and an advocate of "social justice." For a variety of rea-
sons, some personal, he turned violently on Roosevelt and sponsored his own third
party presidential candidate in 1936. Following the election, Coughlin became virulently
anti-Semitic and pro-fascist. His broadcasts and articles grew increasingly bitter and
violent until he was finally silenced in 1942 under the threat of prosecution and pres-
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Nazi rhetoric,100 and upon the emergence of small but vocal bands
of fascists such as the German-American Bund and the Silver Shirts. 01
Even before the outbreak of World War Two, some Americans at-
tributed the rise of anti-Semitism in the United States' 0 2 to delib-
erate Nazi propaganda.10 3 More generally, in 1938 The Nation noted
the "festering infection of our own racial prejudices-our anti-Negro
and anti-Jewish feeling" and attributed it to the growth of regional
fascism and the extralegal terrorism that accompanied it°4 Concern
was also expressed about hostility toward other groups, including the
increasingly overt and violent sentiment against the Jehovah's Wit-
nesses, 05 and Mayor Frank Hague's expulsion of CIO organizers from
Jersey City.106
sure from the Catholic hierarchy. See S. MARCUS, FATHER COUGHLIN (1973); R. SWING,
supra note 41, at 34-61; C. TuLL, FATHER COUGHLIN AND THE NEW DEAL (1965).
100. See INSTITUTE FOR PROPAGANDA ANALYSIS, THE FINE ART OF PROPAGANDA (1939);
IV. KERNAN, THE GHOST OF ROYAL OAK (1940); D. STRONG, ORGANIZED ANTI-SEMITISM IN
AMERICA 61-63 (2d ed. 1941); C. TuLL, suPra note 99, at 197, 243-44; Neilson, "Minorities"
in Our Midst, 28 SURVEY GRAPHIC 101, 103 (1939). Commentators do not agree on the
extent to which Coughlin had connections with the German government. Compare A.
FRYE, NAZI GERMANY AND THE AMERICAN HEMISPHERE, 1933-1941, at 154-55 (1967) (Coughlin
may have made actual contact with German representatives in United States) with C.
TULL, suPra note 99, at 244 (no affiliation proved between Coughlin and German gov-
ernment).
101. See D. STRONG, supra note 100, at 21-56; Johnson, The German-American Bund
and Nazi Germany: 1936-1941, STuDIES IN HIST. & SoC'Y, Spring 1975, at 31, 37 ("By
1939, a substantial number of Americans feared the presence of an imitation Third Reich
in New York, St. Louis, Seattle, or for that matter in any American city.") For a compre-
hensive study of eleven anti-revolutionary, anti-Semitic organizations that appeared be-
tween 1933 and 1940, see D. STRONG, supra note 100. See generally Johnson, The Rising
Tide of Anti-Semitism, 28 SURVEY GRAPHIC 113 (1939) (describing anti-Semitic organiza-
tions and propaganda) [hereinafter cited as Johnson-Rising Tide].
102. D. STRONG, supra note 100, at 146-47; Johnson-Rising Tide, supra note 101, at
113; see Memorandum of Discussion at a Conference Called by Justice Felix Frankfurter
in Washington, D.C. (Apr. 10, 1939) (Max Lerner Papers, Box 3, Folder 119, Yale Uni-
versity Archives) (illustrating concern of American Jewish leaders, including Frankfurter,
about rising anti-Semitism in United States in late 1930s) [hereinafter cited as Memo-
randum].
103. Socialist Max Lerner, who had previously attributed this phenomenon to eco-
nomic insecurity, was one of these observers. Memorandum, supra note 102, at 7-8, 10.
To Lerner, anti-Semitism was "a major weapon in the Nazi arsenal for destroying the
democratic structure." Id. at 12. Dr. Alfred Cohn, a philosopher and physician, observed
that the Nazis used not only Jews, but all available minority groups, to disrupt and
destroy the internal social structure of other countries. Id.
Propaganda efforts by Nazi agents in the United States had been investigated in the
mid-1930s by a House committee chaired by Rep. John McCormack. SPECIAL HOUSE COMM.
ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES, INVESTIGATION OF NAZI AND OTHER PROPAGANDA, H.R. REP.
No. 153, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935).
104. 146 NATION 633 (1938).
105. A. MASON, supra note 32, at 533; Rotnem & Folsom, Recent Restrictions Upon
Religious Liberty, 36 AM. POLITICAL Sm. REV. 1053, 1061-62 (1942). Attacks on Jehovah's
Witnesses were particularly disturbing because they also had been a special object of
persecution in Nazi Germany. J. CONWAY, THE NAZI PRsEcUTnON OF THE CHURCHES 195-
99 (1968); J. SIMON, INDEPENDENT JOURNEY 206 (1980).
106. Hague's policy, challenged successfully in Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939),
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Some analysts recognized that the stimulation of group conflict had
particularly serious consequences for the survival of democracy in a
polyglot nation such as the United States. A book entitled What
Mein Kampf Means to America contended that, in the "mongrel"
society the United States had become, "[t]he idea of erecting race
prejudice into the central principle of a society" was the "most sin-
ister contradiction" of the "American idea" that could be advanced. °7
In The March of Fascism, Stephen Raushenbush warned that Ameri-
cans were even more prepared for the idea of relegating minorities
to second-class citizenship than were pre-Hitler Germans.108 The treat-
ment of blacks and the ease with which religious intolerance had
been inflamed during the 1920s demonstrated the dangerous poten-
tial for persecution in America.109 Raushenbush warned that millions
of Americans were still capable of being "stampeded by racialism,
bigotry, or fear, or deluded by Messianic promises of work, security,
and superiority." 110 Once the process of persecution was underway,
he warned, it could not be contained. "[W]ith racialism, as with an-
tireligion or totalitarianism, there is no convenient stopping place
between a little social animus and murder.""' Psychologist Ellis Free-
man warned that the "psychological projection of guilt upon scape-
goats, one of the prerequisites of Fascism, is carried out already on
a grand scale in this country," adding that Americans, like Germans,
were very susceptible to agitation by messianic demagogues."12 Others
joined in sounding the alarm. 1 3
was widely viewed as a prototype of the suppression of a political minority by a dic-
tator to whom the majority had abdicated political power. See, e.g., M. RADER, supra
note 82, at 339; S. RAUSHENBUSH, supra note 84, at 329-30; 146 NATON 546-47 (1938); id.
at 633; id. at 663; id. at 714; Broun, Shoot the Works, 93 NEw REPUBLIC 307 (1938). For
an analysis of Hague's repressive methods, see D. McKEAN, THE Boss at xiii-xviii, 187-201,
227-48, 268-77 (1940). Condemnation of Hague's violations of civil liberties did not come
only from liberals; the American Bar Association's new Bill of Rights Committee filed
an amicus brief in the Supreme Court case. L. LusKY, supra note 4, at x.
107. F. HACKETr, WHAT MEIN KAMPF MEANS To AMERICA 188-90 (1941).
108. S. RAUSHENBUSH, supra note 84, at 11-15; see id. at 329-30 (describing process of
destroying civil liberties and attacking minorities).
109. Id. at 12-14. Another author wrote that racism was inherently dangerous, and
that the practice of lynching showed America's vulnerability to outbreaks of minority
persecution similar to those that had occurred in Europe. M. RADER, supra note 82, at
100, 117-18, 145.
110. S. RAUSHENBUSH, supra note 84, at 333.
111. Id. at 117; see id. at 126 (anti-Semitism leads to murder, expropriation, and
destruction of "principles of minority rights which are essential parts of democracy").
112. E. FREEMAN, supra note 76, at 328-29.
113. Professor Clyde Miller of Columbia predicted that the stresses of the postwar
period could produce the search for new racial or religious scapegoats in this country
against whom popular discontent could be directed. Miller, supra note 84, at iv; see M.
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In a 1942 article entitled Minority Rights and the Public Interest,
Louis Lusky argued that group conflict posed another threat to Ameri-
can democracy.114 In Lusky's view, the preservation of free government
depended upon the ability to instill a sense of political obligation in
the populace. This sense of obligation could be maintained only if
all groups had access to and participated in the political process, the
basic mechanism for resolving conflicting interests. Once a minority
was excluded from the democratic process, its members would be-
come alienated and suppression would be necessary to control them.
Group prejudice and conflict, by causing the exclusion of minorities
from political participation, would therefore lead to the downfall of
free government.11 5
C. Preserving the Democratic System
Recognition of the dangers of unrestrained majoritarianism and of
exploitation of the majority's emotional desires and antagonisms pro-
duced various responses. One suggested antidote was the maintenance
of democratic procedures by an independent judiciary. If minorities
were guaranteed the right to participate in the political process, they
would not resort to extralegal opposition.11 6 Substantive protections
for minorities were also advocated as a means of thwarting majority
tyranny. Even when the integrity of the political process was not im-
paired, the danger of permitting the majority to single out for mis-
treatment any particular racial or religious group justified judicial
protection of minority rights.117
Some commentators took the notion of providing substantive pro-
tection for minorities to a somewhat paradoxical conclusion. Recog-
nizing the havoc that agitation by fascist groups could cause, they
called for the suppression of speech that did not accept the principles
of democracy or that exploited group conflict. Lippmann, pointing
to Huey Long's Louisiana, warned against permitting speakers to so-
DAVIE, suPra note 73, at 371 (recognizing threat to national unity and welfare posed by
promotion of ethnic hatred); cf. Johnson-Rising Tide, supra note 101, at 113 ("Every
vulgar and designing scoundrel in America who schemes to substitute dictatorship for
democracy casts a greedy eye upon the potentialities of an anti-Semitic campaign.")
114. Lusky, Minority Rights and the Public Interest, 52 YALE L.J. 1 (1942).
115. Id. at 3-6, 20-21.
116. See, e.g., Janowsky, supra note 84, at 76-77; Lusky, supra note 114, at 5-6, 20-21, 38.
117. Lusky, supra note 114, at 21-22, 38-40; cf. Neilson, supra note 100, at 103 (safety
of all Americans depends on just treatment of minority groups because "[wie are all in
some aspects members of minorities... and once the democratic principle is abandoned
no one's liberty is assured').
759
The Yale Law Journal
licit a majority mandate to destroy democracy. 18 In light of the
rise of fascism, Thompson and Lerner emphasized the need to prevent
subversion by fascist groups."19 Loewenstein also argued for the sup-
pression of fascist sentiments. As an open mass movement, he wrote,
fascism could be successful only by using the opportunity for unfet-
tered political organization offered by the "cover of fundamental rights
and the rule of law" found in democratic regimes. 120 He described
the suicidal error of democracy when faced by such movements:
Democracies are legally bound to allow the emergence and rise
of anti-parliamentarian and anti-democratic parties under the con-
dition that they conform outwardly to the principles of legality
and free play of public opinion. It is the exaggerated formalism
of the rule of law which under the enchantment of formal equali-
ty does not see fit to exclude from the game parties that deny the
very existence of its rules.
121
To combat the exploitation of group prejudice, Loewenstein and
several other commentators advocated the punishment of group libel.
22
Although observers in the late 1930s and early 1940s differed in
their analyses of democracy and their proffered responses, it is evident
that most of them shared the same basic fears. They were apprehensive
about unrestrained majoritarianism, persecution of minorities, manipu-
lation of the majority by popular authoritarians, and deliberate use
of group prejudice to maintain the cohesiveness of the majority. To
118. Lippmann, Today and Tomorrow, N.Y. Herald Tribune, Feb. 5, 1935, § 1, at
19, col. 1; cf. Lippmann, Today and Tomorrow, N.Y. Herald Tribune, Mar. 16, 1935,
§ 1, at 15, cols. 1-2 (democracy has right to suppress speech of those who seek to de-
stroy liberty).
119. M. LERNF, supra note 31, at 96, 103 (civil liberties do not include formation of
military and semi-military units); THOMPSON-RECORD, supra note 54, at 118-19 (demo-
cratic principles may not require "gracious hospitality" for agitators directed from
abroad who seek to destroy democracy); see Mowrer, supra note 31, at 189-90 (protection
of democracy may require banning of doctrines that espouse dictatorship).
120. Loewenstein, supra note 31, at 425-24.
121. Id. at 424. Loewenstein's call for suppression of fascist movements was joined
by Freeman. E. FREEMAN, supra note 76, at 326-27. But see MacLeish, Freedom to End
Freedom, 28 SURVEY GRAPHiC 117, 117-19 (1939) (fascism cannot be fought by suppressing
fascists without destroying democracy).
122. Loewenstein, Legislative Control of Political Extremism in European Democra-
cies, II, 38 CoLUM. L. Rav. 725, 743-45 (1938) (applauding use of group libel laws in
Europe); Lusky, suPra note 114, at 36 (First Amendment does not protect willful ag-
gravation of social conflict, which strikes at foundations of political cohesion of United
States); Riesman, Democracy and Defamation (pts. 1-2), 42 COLUM. L. REv. 727, 1085 (1942)
(supporting use of group libel laws to control exploitation of racism for political ends);
cf. S. RAUSHENBUSH, supra note 84, at 20-21 (noting that weakness of libel laws makes
possible dangerous anti-minority agitation, but stopping short of advocating prohibition
of group libel).
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this extent, the explanations of democracy expressed by a wide spec-
trum of opinion during this period represented a loose consensus
regarding contemporary threats to democracy. The two traditional
versions of tyranny, autocratic dictatorship and unrestrained majoritar-
ianism, had converged upon one basic diagnosis. This broad con-
sensus, and the divergences within it, exerted significant influence on
the Supreme Court and its decisionmaking.
II. The Court and the Politics of Unreason
The composition of the Supreme Court changed significantly be-
tween 1935 and 1940. President Roosevelt made five new appoint-
ments, forming the core of what came to be known as the "Roosevelt
Court.' 2 3 By the late 1930s, some of these new Justices, and at least
one of the sitting Justices, had adopted all or part of the new con-
sensus regarding the vulnerability of democracy to hysterical majori-
tarianism. Although anti-majoritarianism had been a cornerstone of
the ideology of the Court's conservative bloc in the 1930s,' 24 the new
ideology transformed the nature of the perceived threat posed by un-
restrained majority rule. In the latter half of the decade, events in
Europe and in the United States generated increased concern about
group prejudice and a new sense of urgency about violations of civil
liberties. 2 5 The Justices, however, held differing views regarding the
proper role of the judiciary and the balance between individual and
social interests. Therefore, different Justices responded to these com-
monly perceived dangers with divergent approaches to concrete con-
troversies.
123. The appointees, in chronological order, were Hugo L. Black, Stanley Reed, Felix
Frankfurter, William 0. Douglas, and Frank Murphy. C. PRITCHETT, supra note 1, at 9-10.
124. Justice Sutherland, the intellectual leader of the "Four Horsemen" who struck
down major pieces of New Deal legislation, was steeped in a conservative tradition that
had long taught that the greatest danger of democratic rule arose from the excesses of
majoritarianism. Majority rule, in Sutherland's view, threatened the oppression of the
propertied minority. See G. SUTHERLAND, supra note 27, at 14-16 (Constitution protects
property rights against hasty legislation).
125. Justice Brandeis, in his early dissenting opinions in First Amendment cases, had
stressed the need to protect the expression of minority views from "tyrannous, well-
meaning majorities." Schaefer v. United States, 251 U.S. 466, 482 (1920) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting); see Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)
(framers designed First Amendment to protect against "occasional tyrannies of governing
majorities"); Pierce v. United States, 252 U.S. 239, 269 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(danger that juries will "deny members of small political parties freedom of criticism
and of discussion in times when feelings run high'). Brandeis' views, however, though
sometimes joined by Holmes, did not command a majority of the Court in the 1920s.
In addition, their dissents focused on political minority groups, such as anarchists, rather
than on "minorities" within the meaning of Carolene Products. See Rabban, The First
Amendment in Its Forgotten Years, 90 YALE; L.J. 514, 591-93 (1981).
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A. Harlan Fiske Stone
Heightened awareness of the vulnerability of democracy is particu-
larly evident in the writings and correspondence of Harlan Fiske
Stone, the author of footnote four of Carolene Products. In the early
and middle 1930s, Stone interpreted domestic events in the terms of
both paradigms; democracy was endangered both by autocratic rule
on the one hand and by majoritarianism on the other. In the late
1930s, his attention focused increasingly on the plight of isolated
minority groups and on the protection they should be given by a
democratic system.
Stone disapproved of the concentration of power in the federal gov-
ernment,126 controlled by the Democratic Party, and in the hands of
the Chief Executive. He deplored the apparent abdication of authority
by Congress in the early New Deal period, when it summarily passed
every measure proposed by the President; 127 he opposed the Court
packing plan;' 28 and he feared that Roosevelt's election for a third
term in 1940 would lead to the demise of the two-party system.12,
On the other hand, he had an acute sense of the fragility of democ-
racy in the face of an aroused popular will. Stone believed that the
government must have the power to control private economic inter-
ests for the general welfare; 30 the Court's resistance to such efforts,
he warned in 1936, could precipitate a revolution.' 31 He also disliked
appeals to the emotions of the populace. In 1938, for example, he
displayed irritation at the manner in which the Administration de-
nounced the Nazi treatment of Jews, writing of the "sad spectacle"
of government officials "hurling billingsgate at the Nazis in the best
Nazi style."1 3
2
126. A Republican and a friend of Hoover, Stone disagreed with the substance of
most New Deal measures. A. MASoN, sutra note 32, at 305, 371, 416, 426, 544. He believed
that the welfare measures were undermining the strength and self-reliance of the Amer-
ican people, in contrast to the discipline that Hitler's rule was instilling in Nazi Ger-
many. Id. at 544.
127. Id. at 371.
128. Id. at 446. The Court packing plan led Stone to write, "It almost makes you
wonder, whether the democratic form of government can permanently endure, and
whether we will not ultimately go the way that so many European countries seem to
be going now." Id.
129. Id. at 548.
130. Id. at 322, 344, 360, 371-73.
131. Letter from Irving Brant to Alpheus Mason (July 22, 1951) (Harlan Fiske Stone
Papers, Box 83, Library of Congress). Nine years later and delirious after suffering a
fatal stroke, Stone moaned repeatedly, "When will the revolution come." Id.
132. Letter from Harlan F. Stone to John B. Moore (Dec. 23, 1938) (Harlan Fiske
Stone Papers, Box 22, Library of Congress). Stone was sympathetic, however, to the
plight of refugees from Nazi Germany. A. MASON, supra note 32, at 547.
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The evils and potential dangers of majority prejudice and the vic-
timization of minority groups were brought forcefully to Stone's at-
tention in a series of letters from several correspondents in the late
1930s. Judge Learned Hand wrote to him in 1938 about the emergence
in Europe of societies characterized by ant-like uniformity and the
rule of the "overwhelmingly powerful group."133 The letters Stone
received from Judge John Bassett Moore' 34 addressed these issues in
a particularly provocative manner. In March 1939, Moore wrote about
the hypocrisy of those who criticized Nazi Germany. "We are now
parading and bawling... against racial discrimination, and yet there
is no people that more flagrantly practices it than our own." Moore
pointed to immigration and naturalization laws excluding Chinese,
Japanese, and other nonwhites, and added, "Before we excluded them
we now and then massacred them." He also pointed to "Jim Crow"
laws requiring racial segregation:
[O]nly the other day I saw the complaint of a negro legislator
that he had been denied "equal accommodations" on a railway
train. Our highest officials coddle and fawn upon negroes in Har-
lem, but forbear to suggest, much less to demand, that they be put
on an equal footing with the whites as regards the suffrage in
the South.135
Moore subsequently compared the treatment accorded to Jehovah's
Witnesses in the United States to the state of affairs in Nazi Germany'
38
and wrote sarcastically about the approval given to the harassment of
Communists by the Governor of Wisconsin, whose first name was
"Heil."'137 According to Moore, the prevalent view of freedom in the
United States was that "one is at liberty to agree with those who have
the power to proscribe dissent."138
133. Letter from Learned Hand to Harlan F. Stone (July 18, 1938) (Harlan Fiske
Stone Papers, Box 15, Library of Congress).
134. John Bassett Moore was a prominent scholar of international law who had
served as a Judge on the Permanent Court of International Justice at The Hague. 2
WHO WAs WHO IN AMERICA 380 (1950).
135. Letter from John B. Moore to Harlan F. Stone (Mar. 27, 1939) (Harlan Fiske
Stone Papers, Box 22, Library of Congress).
136. Letter from John B. Moore to Harlan F. Stone (July 13, 1940) (Harlan Fiske
Stone Papers, Box 22, Library of Congress).
137. Letter from John B. Moore to Harlan F. Stone (July 19, 1940) (Harlan Fiske
Stone Papers, Box 22, Library of Congress) ("I assume that the Governor does not pub-
licly associate [his name] with Hitler .... He is himself a genuine American who believes
in free speech for all those who do not differ with him.')
138. Letter from John B. Moore to Harlan F. Stone (June 10, 1942) (Harlan Fiske
Stone Papers, Box 22, Library of Congress).
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The work of Professor Loewenstein 39 also came to Stone's atten-
tion. Their contact began in January 1938, when Loewenstein wrote
Stone, an alumnus and active trustee of Amherst, introducing him-
self and thanking Stone for a favorable comment to Brandeis con-
cerning an article by Loewenstein.140 Loewenstein enclosed reprints
of articles he had published in 1937, the year in which Militant Democ-
racy and Fundamental Rights appeared.141 Stone and Loewenstein con-
tinued to correspond and occasionally to meet at least until 1942,142
and Stone appears to have been favorably impressed by Loewenstein's
writing.
43
It is, of course, impossible to determine the extent to which Stone
agreed with his correspondents. Nevertheless, it is clear that Stone
was developing a new perception of the interaction between ma-
jorities and minorities and integrating this perception into his theories
of judicial review. Footnote four of his opinion in Carolene Products4 4
represents one of the earliest expressions of Stone's new approach.
The Carolene Products footnote reflects dearly the influence of
the developing consensus about democracy. First, the notion that
certain civil liberties must be protected in order to preserve the pos-
sibility of political change 45 meshes with the view espoused by Lipp-
mann and others that a temporary majority should not be permitted
to abrogate political rights.' 46 Second, Stone specifies one, and only
one, force against which substantive protection was needed, notwith-
139. See pp. 754, 760 supra.
140. Letter from Karl Loewenstein to Harlan F. Stone (Jan. 6, 1938) (Harlan Fiske
Stone Papers, Box 19, Library of Congress).
141. Loewenstein, supra note 31. The following year, another article by Loewenstein
about fascism appeared in the Columbia Law Review. Loewenstein, supra note 122. It
seems probable that Stone, a trustee of the review, and Louis Lusky, a former Columbia
articles editor and Stone's law clerk that year, read the article.
142. Letter from Harlan F. Stone to Karl Loewenstein (June 3, 1942) (Harlan Fiske
Stone Papers, Box 19, Library of Congress).
143. Letter from Harlan F. Stone to Karl Loewenstein (Jan. 18, 1938) (Harlan Fiske
Stone Papers, Box 19, Library of Congress); Letter from Harlan F. Stone to Karl Loewen-
stein (Dec. 17, 1940) (Harlan Fiske Stone Papers, Box 19, Library of Congress).
144. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). The genesis
of footnote four, see A. MASON, supra note 32, at 512-15, and the theory of judicial review
that it contains, see J. ELY, suPra note 3, have been discussed extensively and need not
be reviewed here.
145. The second paragraph of footnote four states:
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts those political
processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable
legislation, is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general
prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types of legislation.
304 U.S. at 152 n.4.
It then refers to cases dealing with restrictions on the right to vote, restraints on the
dissemination of information, interferences with political organizations, and prohibitions
of peaceable assemblies. Id.
146. See pp. 748-51 supra.
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standing the unimpeded operation of the political process. That force
was group prejudice. 147 Footnote four thus embodies the concern
emerging in the late 1930s that democracy was particularly vulnerable
to the exploitation of the animosities of the majority toward mi-
nority groups. Stone recognized this danger in a letter to Judge Irving
Lehman written the day after the Carolene Products decision was
announced:
I have been deeply concerned about the increasing racial and
religious intolerance which seems to bedevil the world, and which
I greatly fear may be augmented in this country. For that reason
I was greatly disturbed by the attacks on the Court and the Con-
stitution last year, for one consequence of the program of "ju-
dicial reform" might well result in breaking down the guaranties
of individual liberty.1 48
Louis Lusky, Stone's law clerk in 1938, who authored the first draft
of footnote four, attributed the same significance to the passage. In
a letter to Stone in 1942, he wrote that the footnote recognized "the
relationship between discrimination against minority groups and the
disappearance of 'free' government."1 49
Third, footnote four reflects the influence of contemporary think-
ing by assigning the Court the duty aggressively to protect the political
process against group prejudice. During the circulation of his Caro-
lene Products draft opinion, 50 Stone hinted that he was prepared to
147. The third paragraph of footnote four states:
Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the review of statutes
directed at particular religious .... or national .... or racial minorities.... : whether
prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which
tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be
relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more
searching judicial inquiry.
304 U.S. at 152 n.4.
148. A. MASON, supra note 32, at 515.
149. Letter from Louis Lusky to Harlan F. Stone (Oct. 26, 1942) (Harlan Fiske Stone
Papers, Box 19, Library of Congress). Lusky later elaborated further on the link between
group prejudice and the collapse of democracy. Lusky, supra note 114, at 5-6; see p. 759
supra.
150. The first draft of footnote four was worded more strongly than the final version
with respect to the necessity for judicial action to counter the corrosive effect of preju-
dice on the political process. It stated unequivocally, "Different considerations may ap-
ply, and one attacking the constitutionality of a statute may be thought to bear a
lighter burden, when the legislation aims at restricting the corrective political processes
which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation." With
reference to statutes directed at particular religious or racial minorities, the draft
declared:
Prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition in such
situations, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes
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go beyond the specific provisions of the first ten amendments to strike
down discriminatory or oppressive legislative action. 151 To Justice
Black, who had objected that the opinion still left too much power
to the courts, Stone admitted that the "battle of saving proper scope
to the legislative power from curtailment by courts is a hard one," but
added tartly, "I do not think we aid it by not recognizing the ap-
propriate boundaries of the issues which must be drawn."' 52
In the years immediately following Carolene Products, Stone rec-
ognized that the suppression of Jehovah's Witnesses exemplified the
forces threatening the survival of the democratic process. His dissent
in Minersville School District v. Gobitis153 made explicit the link be-
tween majority prejudice and the suppression of civil liberties: "His-
tory teaches us that there have been but few infringements of per-
sonal liberty by the state ... which have not been directed, as they
are now, at politically helpless minorities."'" Rejecting the majority
opinion's deference to the legislature, Stone added, "This seems to
me no less than the surrender of the constitutional protection of the
liberty of small minorities to the popular will."1 55 This analysis of
democratic dysfunction resonated with the new consensus in con-
temporary ideology.
Other members of the Roosevelt Court were altering their percep-
tions of democracy in the late 1930s along similar lines. Their starting
points were not identical to Stone's; it is doubtful that the Roosevelt
appointees shared his anxiety about the autocratic implications of
Roosevelt's extended presidency.156 Nevertheless, it appears that many
normally to be relied on to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspond-
ingly more searching judicial scrutiny.
Stone Draft Opinion (2d) at 6 n.4, No. 640 (Apr. 1938) (Harlan Fiske Stone Papers, Box
63, Library of Congress).
151. Chief Justice Hughes objected that the matters raised in the footnote involved
different rights but not a different test of validity. Note from Charles Evans Hughes to
Harlan F. Stone, No. 640 (Apr. 18, 1938) (Harlan Fiske Stone Papers, Box 63, Library
of Congress). Stone replied, "There are, however, possible restraints on liberty and po-
litical rights which do not fall within those specific prohibitions [of the first ten amend-
ments] and are forbidden only by the general words of the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment." Note from Harlan F. Stone to Charles Evans Hughes, No. 640
(Apr. 19, 1938) (Harlan Fiske Stone Papers, Box 63, Library of Congress).
152. Note from Harlan F. Stone to Hugo Black, No. 640 (Apr. 22, 1938) (Harlan Fiske
Stone Papers, Box 63, Library of Congress).
153. 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
154. Id. at 604 (Stone, J., dissenting). The majority upheld the constitutionality of
compulsory flag salutes in the public schools against a religious challenge by Jehovah's
Witnesses.
155. Id. at 606.
156. Frankfurter and Douglas both wrote memoranda for Roosevelt justifying his
decision to run for a third term. Lash, A Brahmin of the Law: A Biographical Essay,
in FRox TnE DAu~ms OF Faux FRANxKrFuRE 77 (J. Lash ed. 1975).
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of the other Justices came to share Stone's concern about the dangers
of unrestrained majoritarianism and, particularly, the threat of group
prejudice.
B. Felix Frankfurter
Felix Frankfurter was even more directly conversant with contem-
porary intellectual currents and events in Europe than Stone. He cor-
responded regularly with Lippmann until the latter described Hitler
as "the authentic voice of a genuinely civilized people" in 1933.157
He was a close friend of Max Lerner and, until his appointment to
the Court, a member of the Board of Directors of Survey Associates,
the organization that published Survey Graphic.158 From 1933 to 1934
he spent a year at Oxford, and during the 1930s he was involved in
efforts to assist refugees from Europe and make known the horrors
of Nazi Germany.159
Sensitive to his own Judaism, 60 Frankfurter was deeply troubled by
the rise of fascism. As early as 1933, he wrote to Roosevelt from
England that the "violence and madness now dominating in Germany
. . . make it abundantly clear that the significance of Hitlerism far
transcends ferocious anti-semitism and fanatical racism."'161 Concern
that the same madness would spread to the United States led him
to admonish Lerner in 1936 that nothing was more important than
"to inoculate our people against fascist-mindedness."' 62 Although anti-
Semitism had always been a fact of life for him, he discerned and
expressed concern about the unmistakable increase in anti-Semitic ac-
157. R. STEEL, suPra note 30, at 220-23, 331-32.
158. Frankfurter contributed to a 1939 special issue of Survey Graphic, entitled Call-
ing America. See note 93 supra. Apparently at the request of Frankfurter, Paul Kellogg,
editor of Survey Graphic, sent the Calling America issue to Justice Black. See Letter from
Paul Kellogg to Hugo Black (Feb. 15, 1939) (Hugo L. Black Papers, Box 60, Library of
Congress).
159. L. BAKER, FELIX FRANKFURTER 197-99 (1969); ROOSEVELT AND FRANKFURTER 449-56
(M. Freedman ed. 1967). Frankfurter, however, has been criticized by some for being
too discreet in his criticism of Nazi Germany. L. BAKER, supra, at 197.
160. L. BAKER, supra note 159, at 197; Lash, supra note 156, at 73.
161. Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Franklin D. Roosevelt (Oct. 17, 1933), in ROOSE-
VELT AND FRANKFURTER, supra note 159, at 164. Frankfurter continued, "[T]he attack
against the Jew is merely an index to the gospel of force and materialism that explains
the present rulers of Germany." Id.
162. Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Max Lerner (Mar. 1936) (Max Lerner Papers,
Box 3, Folder 117, Yale University Archives). In the same year, he wrote that the demo-
cratic faith of many Americans had been invigorated by contemporary events, including
"nauseat[ing] . . . 'purges'" in Germany, which had disclosed "the inevitable operations
of dictatorship." F. FRANKFURTER, The Young Men Go to Washington, in LAW AND POLITICS
238, 238-39 (1939) (magazine article appearing in January 1936).
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tivity during the latter half of the 1930s.163 He also perceived that
anti-Semitism was part of the larger phenomenon of social demorali-
zation resulting from group prejudice.0 4 For many years a legal ad-
viser to the NAACP, 0 5 Frankfurter acknowledged that "the colored
problem is the most complicated and baffling of all our social
problems." 66
Frankfurter also suggested that the isolation of minorities was linked
to the weakening of democratic government. In Lane v. Wilson, 67 a
decision invalidating Oklahoma's racially discriminatory restrictions
on voter registration, he wrote that discrimination had created "a body
of citizens lacking the habits and traditions of political independence
and otherwise living in circumstances which do not encourage initia-
tive and enterprise."1 8 Thus, the effects of group prejudice threatened
the social cohesion, the "community of common ideals,"'016 that Frank-
furter believed essential in American society.
Frankfurter maintained that cohesiveness and mutual tolerance de-
pended not only on widely shared economic security,170 but also on
163. Memorandum, supra note 102, at 1, 3, 8; Letter from Max Lerner to Felix Frank-
furter (June 10, 1938) (Max Lerner Papers, Box 3, Folder 122, Yale University Archives).
164. Commenting to Justice Stanley Reed in 1944 on Lillian Smith's Strange Fruit,
a novel depicting the failure of respectable citizens to intervene against terrorism di-
rected against blacks in the rural South, Frankfurter wrote: "I also know that the atti-
tude indicated in the paragraph I have marked is precisely the attitude responsible
for the Dreyfus case, and I further know that the Dreyfus case more than any one sin-
gle factor brought the corrosion in France that led to the awful debacle in 1940." Note
from Felix Frankfurter to Stanley Reed (Apr. 25, 1944) (Felix Frankfurter Papers, Box
92, File 1923, Library of Congress); see D. BROGAN, FRANCE UNDER THE REPUBLIC 305-10,
357-87 (1940) (discussion of Dreyfus affair to which Frankfurter's letter referred); cf. Mem-
orandum, supra note 102, at 8 (Jews "victims of a strong, generic, nativist prejudice"
because "associated in the Southern mind with the alien').
165. R. KLuGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 115 (1976).
166. Note from Felix Frankfurter to Stanley Reed, supra note 164.
167. 307 US. 268 (1939).
168. Id. at 276.
169. Telegram from Felix Frankfurter to Raymond Moley (Sept. 24, 1935), in ROOSE-
VELT AND FRANKFURTER, supra note 159, at 287. Frankfurter regarded this feature as one
of the most important characteristics of the United States. Id.; F. FRANKFURTER, America
and the Immigrant, in LAw AND POLMTCS 198, 199 (1939) (shared ideals of American peo-
ple); FROM THE DzuFs Or FELix FRANKFURTER 212 (J. Lash ed. 1975) (meaning of Amer-
ican citizenship). Lusky held similar views about the need for social cohesion. Lusky,
supra note 114, at 39-40.
170. He wrote in 1937, in a draft speech prepared for delivery by Roosevelt:
[U]nless government can succeed in creating conditions under which the great mass
of people do feel convinced of justice, economic security and ample scope for hu-
man dignity, that tolerance of differences and that general concern for fair play
which are the real protection of the individual and minorities will disappear ....
[These qualities] are the natural reflection of magnanimity of spirit in the masses
which in turn depends upon generally distributed well-being.
Draft of Constitution Day Speech, in ROOSEVELT AND FRANKFURTER, supra note 159, at
409, 414 (speech delivered Sept. 17, 1937); see id. at 414-16 (economic distress threatens
tolerance and concern for fairness).
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constant education and discussion of American ideals. At a meeting
of prominent Jews called by Frankfurter in 1939 to discuss strategies
for combating anti-Semitism in the United States, he urged a strategy
of drawing on "the innate decencies" of the American people and
their faith in democracy. He believed that the public would "balk
any attempt to make a minority group the victim of intolerance,"' 7'
but that they must be educated about the fundamental nature of
American society. To combat prejudice, Frankfurter asserted, "we
should make clear that all groups in America move in framework of
common fellowship." He added that
the Constitution was framed for an indefinite future, for differ-
ent people and different races. This conception of American de-
mocracy which differentiates our society from that, say, of Sweden
or Holland, needs to be spelled out and repeated again and again.
Otherwise we may permit the emasculation of our democracy into
a far more shallow way of life, under which foreign groups do
not become citizens, but remain in all realistic essentials merely
temporary guests. 172
While Frankfurter expressed confidence in the innate good sense
of the American people, he also evinced a willingness to support
strong, arguably repressive measures to enforce the cohesion of Ameri-
can society. For example, as Joseph Lash and Richard Danzig have
shown, Frankfurter's desire to mobilize public opinion and his ob-
session with the flag as a symbol of national unity distorted his
opinion upholding the compulsory flag salute in Minersville School
District v. Gobitis.17 3
171. Memorandum, supra note 102, at 8.
172. Id. at 10.
173. 310 U.S. 586 (1940); see Danzig, How Questions Begot Answers in Felix Frank-
furter's First Flag Salute Opinion, 1977 Sup. CT. REv. 257; Lash, supra note 156, at 68-70.
Frankfurter also demonstrated his belief that government had the power to demand
adherence to the "principles of the Constitution" by joining Stone's dissent in Schneider-
man v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 170 (1943). In that case, the majority refused to per-
mit the revocation of Schneiderman's naturalized citizenship on the ground that he had
been a Communist and therefore had lacked attachment to those principles at the time
of his naturalization. Id. at 131-59. In a note to Stone, Frankfurter asserted that attach-
ment to constitutional principles created "the bond of fellowship of citizens." Note from
Felix Frankfurter to Harlan F. Stone (May 31, 1943) (Felix Frankfurter Papers, Box 85,
File 1763, Library of Congress). Schneiderman's naturalization, Frankfurter believed,
could be valid only if these principles were reduced to trivialities. Liss, The Schneiderman
Case: An Inside View of the Roosevelt Court, 74 MicH. L. REv. 500, 510, 515-16 (1976).
Many years later, in Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952), Frankfurter cited
both his friend David Riesman and Professor Karl Loewenstein, see note 122 supra, to
support his decision that the state could constitutionally employ group libel laws to
control the political exploitation of racism. 343 U.S. at 259 n.9, 261 n.16.
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The role assigned by Frankfurter to the Court reflected his em-
phasis upon national unity as well as his view that the Court could
not, over time, successfully withstand the popular spirit.17 4 Despite
his concern about the oppression of minorities, he was cautious about
judicial creation of substantive protections for them.175 On the other
hand, the Court fulfilled its primary role when it acted to protect
the integrity of the political process. In a letter to Stone on the eve
of Gobitis, Frankfurter acknowledged the fundamental soundness of
the judicial role Stone had set forth in the second paragraph of foot-
note four.178 The Court, Frankfurter argued, could properly intervene
to keep open "all those channels of free expression by which undesir-
able legislation may be removed" and keep unobstructed "all forms
of protest against what are deemed invasions of conscience."' 77 He
repeated this theme in a 1941 essay arguing that respect for the guar-
antees of the Bill of Rights would assure that dogmas would be re-
placed and "the paths to the City of God . ..be kept open."'178
C. Frank Murphy
Like Frankfurter, Frank Murphy had long experience with the
issues of race relations and civil liberties. During his career as local
174. West Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 670-71 (1943) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting); F. FRANK~b'mm, Can the Supreme Court Guarantee Toleration? in LAW AND
PoLTics 195, 197 (1939) (essay written in 1925); F. FRANKFURTER, The Paths Must Be Kept
Open, in OF LAw AND MEN 236, 237 (1956) (essay written in 1941) [hereinafter cited as
Frankfurter-Paths]; Draft of Constitution Day Speech, supra note 170, at 410.
175. Dissenting in the second flag salute case, Frankfurter contended that the state
statute should be upheld against a freedom of religion claim by Jehovah's Witnesses.
He stressed the divergence between his personal and his judicial position. "One who
belongs to the most vilified and persecuted minority in history is not likely to be in-
sensible to the freedoms guaranteed by our Constitution," Frankfurter wrote. "Were
my purely personal attitude relevant I should wholeheartedly associate myself with the
general libertarian views in the Court's opinion, representing as they do the thought and
action of a lifetime." West Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 646-47 (1943)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
176. See note 145 supra (quoting paragraph).
177. Note from Felix Frankfurter to Harlan F. Stone (May 27, 1940) (Harlan Fiske
Stone Papers, Box 65, Library of Congress); see Danzig, supra note 173, at 269 (discussing
circumstances of writing of note).
Nevertheless, Frankfurter rejected the concept that free speech was a "preferred free-
dom" deserving special judicial protection. See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 90-96 (1949)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring); West Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 648-49
(1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Moreover, Frankfurter's principles of judicial self-
restraint led him to dissent from judicially ordered reapportionment of state legislative
districts. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 284-88 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). He
believed, however, that the Court should strike down the disenfranchisement of blacks.
Id. at 285-86.
178. Frankfurter-Paths, supra note 174, at 237; cf. Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Brandeis
and the Constitution, 45 HARv. L. Rzv. 33, 90 (1931) (need to protect right to air griev-
ances in times of mass panic).
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judge, mayor of 'Detroit, Governor of Michigan, and Attorney Gen-
eral, Murphy had encountered racism,179 political demagoguery, 80
labor unrest,18 ' and municipal corruption .1 2 He was acutely aware
of the assaults on democracy throughout the world, and his views re-
garding the greatest threat to the democratic system changed in tan-
dem with contemporary intellectual currents.
As Governor of Michigan in 1937, he had negotiated with the sit-
down strikers at General Motors plants rather than using force. 8 3
At that time, he viewed widespread economic deprivation as the great-
est potential source of upheaval. He warned that popular allegiance
to democratic institutions would be in doubt and the threat of dic-
tatorship would persist unless economic conditions were improved.8 4
By 1939, when he became Attorney General, his analysis had begun
to shift to accommodate a concern about the plight of minorities. In-
stituting a program to investigate political corruption in the states
and cities, including Mayor Hague's political machine, he relied on
contemporary rhetoric condemning intolerance and minority persecu-
tion.185 Shortly after the Court repudiated Hague's ejection of CIO
organizers, 88 Murphy delivered a speech in Jersey City condemning
transgressions by public officials against the rights of "the humblest
and most unpopular" minorities. Assisting "in the provocation of race
conflict," manhandling union organizers, and denying certain groups
the right to distribute literature were forms of "intolerance," which
Murphy denounced as "the most un-American, unconstitutional, un-
Christian, and undemocratic thing in our life today."'
87
Again reflecting contemporary thinking, Murphy believed that group
prejudice posed a special threat to the social fabric of the United
179. As Judge of the Detroit Recorder's Court, Murphy presided in 1925 over the
celebrated acquittal of a black man accused of a murder arising out of mob violence
following a black doctor's move into a white neighborhood. J. HOWARD, MR. JusT CE
MURPHY 26-28 (1968). During Murphy's political career, blacks were one of his strongest
constituencies. Id. at 168.
180. During the early 1930s, he maintained contact with Father Coughlin, see notes
99-100 supra, and attempted to convince the priest to continue his support for the New
Deal. J. HOWARD, supra note 179, at 83.
181. See J. HOWARD, supra note 179, at 123-44 (General Motors sit-down strike).
182. See id. at 194-95 (initiation of sweeping anti-corruption campaign by Attorney
General Murphy).
183. Id. at 123-44.
184. Id. at 176-79.
185. See, e.g., Murphy, Civil Liberties and the Cities, reprinted in 84 CONG. REc. 2371
app. (1939) (speech delivered May 15, 1939); Murphy, Civil Liberties, reprinted in 84
CONo. REc. 1352 app. (1939) (radio address delivered Mar. 27, 1939).
186. Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
187. Murphy, The Meaning of Civil Liberty, reprinted in 84 CONG. REc. 2921, 2922
app. (1939) (address delivered June 21, 1939).
The Yale Law Journal
States. Just prior to taking the bench in 1940, he delivered a speech
describing the "resurgence of bigotry and intolerance" in Europe
and drawing a lesson for the United States. "[T]he virus of antisemi-
tism," a tool of "power-mad men" seeking to gain a popular following,
had made itself felt in this country.
The purveyors of hatred, the provokers of division and strife,
the swaggering apostles of force and violence are methodically
and with premeditation laboring to bring to the United States
the same conditions of group hatred and civil war that have
destroyed the peace of Europe.... Unscrupulously they stir up
riots in the city streets, they intimidate peaceful citizens, they
invade meetings, and they peddle as truth the malicious lies which
people of their ilk have invented to blacken those whom they
hate. 88
By the early 1940s, Murphy's campaign transcended the fight against
anti-Semitism. 189 Racial equality had become his most ardent crusade,
and he had come to believe that the nation's treatment of minorities
was the truest test of its allegiance to the values for which it was
fighting. g0 In a speech given in 1944, he warned,
Unless we halt this mounting fury [of racism], the end of this war
may witness the unleashing of a pogrom of hate and persecution
within the United States far greater and more destructive than
that which followed the first World War. Any hope that our civil
liberties can long last in such an atmosphere is futile.' 91
Murphy's responses to these threats to democracy also changed with
time. As he moved away from reliance on economic remedies, he
came to believe that the federal government had an affirmative duty
188. Murphy, The Challenge of Intolerance, reprinted in 86 CONG. lEC. 81, 82 app.
(1940) (address delivered Jan. 7, 1940).
189. Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 650 (1948) (Murphy, J., concurring) (statute
directed against Japanese aliens); see J. HowARD, supra note 179, at 352.
190. J. HowARD, supra note 179, at 347-48, 351. Although he voted with the majority
to uphold a curfew on all persons of Japanese ancestry in the West Coast military area,
Murphy separately concurred to emphasize his misgivings. The curfew, depriving citizens
of liberty "because of their particular racial inheritance . . . bears a melancholy resem-
blance to the treatment accorded to members of the Jewish race in Germany and in
other parts of Europe." Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 111 (1943) (Murphy, J.,
concurring).
191. F. Murphy, The American Way of Life-Can It Survive? at 8 (1944) (pamphlet,
Nat'l Comm. Against Persecution of the Jews) (on file with Yale Law Journal). Murphy
also wrote at length in his private correspondence about the evils of anti-Semitism, anti-
Catholicism, and general intolerance in the United States. See, e.g., Letter from Frank
Murphy to Felix Frankfurter (Nov. 23, 1943) (Felix Frankfurter Papers, Box 85, File 1763,
Library of Congress).
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to intervene on behalf of the politically helpless.192 He established
the Civil Rights Section of the Department of Justice to provide "ag-
gressive protection of fundamental rights inherent in a free people,'
19 3
and he described this action as "one of the most significant happen-
ings in American legal history."'194 Following an initial period of
caution after he joined the Court, Murphy cast aside judicial re-
straint with regard to the protection of minorities. 95 Indeed, he oc-
casionally published a concurring opinion for the sole purpose of
combating the "virus" of racism.196
Yet the use of affirmative government power to protect the "fun-
damental rights" of minorities was not without ambiguity. Murphy
attached paramount importance to the rights of the individual,'
19
and at times he expressed an absolutist view of civil liberties. He
warned in 1940 that to encroach on the Bill of Rights even in an
emergency would "destroy the very democratic principles that we
are seeking to preserve" and "yield to the same autocratic psychology
that we want to keep out of this country." 98 But he also believed, at
the outset of his tenure as a Justice, that all rights were "derived,
essentially, from the purposes of the society in which they exist,199
and he was acutely aware of the dangers of group hatred. When he
was Attorney General, he commenced a series of investigations and
prosecutions against various left- and right-wing groups, including
communist and anti-Semitic organizations. 20 0 His concern about the
exploitation of group prejudice led him, as a Justice, to draft a con-
192. J. HowAa , sukra note 179, at 203-04.
193. R. CARR, FER.AL PROTECTION OF CIVIL RIGHTS 1 (1947).
194. Murphy, Letter to President Roosevelt on the Activities of the Department of
Justice, 84 CONG. REc. 3308, 3310 app. (1939).
195. See Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 208 (1944) (Murphy, J., con-
curring) (objecting to majority's decision "solely upon the basis of legal niceties, while
remaining mute and placid as to the obvious and oppressive deprivation of constitu-
tional guarantees").
196. See, e.g., Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 422 (1948) (Murphy,
J., concurring); Oyama v. California, 332 US. 633, 650, 651 (1948) (Murphy, J., concur-
ring); see J. HowARD, supra note 179, at 352.
197. C. PRITCHErr, supra note 1, at 259; Gressman, The Controversial Image of Mr.
Justice Murphy, 47 GEO. L.J. 631, 635, 636, 648 (1959); see p. 810 infra (Murphy joined
dissent in United States v. Classic because rights of criminal defendant overrode pro-
tection of electoral process against corruption).
198. Murphy, In Defense of Democracy, reprinted in 1940 INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION
185, 189; see Barnett, Mr. Justice Murphy, Civil Liberties and the Holmes Tradition, 32
CORNELL L.Q. 177, 185-86 (1946) (Murphy's view that liberty must be enforced even "for
those who would deny liberty to others if they were in power').
199. J. HOWARD, supra note 179, at 232; see pp. 764, 770 supra (similar views of
Stone and Frankfurter).
200. J. HOwARD, supra note 179, at 211-13.
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curring opinion in Cantwell v. Connecticut201 because he believed
that the majority had not allowed the government sufficient authority
to control racial and religious conflict.20 2 Similarly, Murphy believed
that group defamation was inherently bad and unprotected by the
First Amendment.2 3
D. Hugo L. Black
The deliberate exploitation of racial prejudice for political pur-
poses was not new in Hugo Black's experience. His Alabama back-
ground was steeped in the politics of racism and mob violence, and
indeed, some of his strongest early political support came from mem-
bers of the Ku Klux Klan.20 4 Although Black's views on race relations
were undoubtedly rooted almost entirely in his own experience, 20 5
he was exposed to the same contemporary ideology as his brethren,
20 6
and in the latter half of the 1930s he began to adopt the rhetoric of
the new consensus. Responding to the furor that followed the revela-
tion in 1937 of his past membership in the Klan, Black delivered a
radio speech in which he expressly disavowed any racist or anti-
Semitic beliefs. 207 He also warned of the rapidity with which the
"flames of prejudice" could cause the suppression of religious freedom
and the disruption of communities along racial and religious lines.
208
Chief Justice Hughes gave opportunities to Black to give substance
to his 1937 profession, 20 9 and Black made good use of one such op-
portunity in Chambers v. Florida,210 decided in 1940. His opinion
declared that "[t]yrannical governments had immemorially utilized
dictatorial criminal procedure and punishment to make scapegoats of
the weak, or of helpless political, religious, or racial minorities and
201. 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (invalidating licensing scheme for religious canvassers and
striking down breach of peace conviction).
202. J. HOWARD, supra note 179, at 251. Murphy withheld this opinion after Roberts
added language to the majority opinion acknowledging the state's power to punish in-
citements to racial or religious violence. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309-10
(1940).
203. J. HowARw, supra note 179, at 251, 255.
204. See generally V. HAMILTON, HUGO BLACK: THE ALABAMA YEARS (1972).
205. Interview with John Frank, former law clerk to Justice Black, in Phoenix, Arizona
(Nov. 7, 1980).
206. For example, Black received a courtesy copy of the Calling America issue of
Survey Graphic. Letter from Paul Kellogg to Hugo Black, supra note 158.
207. See C. WILLIAMS, HUGO L. BLACK 27-30 (1950) (reprinting speech in entirety).
208. Id. at 27-28.
209. Interview with John Frank, supra note 205.
210. 309 U.S. 227 (1940). The facts in Chambers, involving forced confessions, were
strikingly reminiscent of practices Black had exposed in the Birmingham suburb of
Bessemer while county prosecutor. J. FRANK, MR. JusnoC BLACK 27-29 (1949); V. HAMILTON,
sura note 204, at 62-64.
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those who differed, who would not conform and who resisted tyr-
anny.' 211 Black described the courts as "havens" for those who suf-
fered because they were "helpless, weak, outnumbered, or because
they are non-conforming victims of prejudice and public excite-
ment."2 12 In 1945, Black warned that the conditions that had "created"
fascism abroad, "the placing of some groups in a preferred class of
citizenship at the expense of other groups," had to be avoided in
the United States. 213
Although Black shared his colleagues' concerns about group hatred,
however, his strong belief in the self-regulating democratic process
led him to adopt a view of the Court's role that was more limited in
scope than Stone's. He maintained that the Court should overturn
legislative choices, including those that adversely affected minorities,
only if a textually clear constitutional guarantee had been violated.
214
Throughout his career, Black's faith in the majoritarian process re-
mained fundamental to his jurisprudence.215
E. William 0. Douglas
The views of William 0. Douglas are more difficult to reconstruct,
in part because during his early legal career he was preoccupied with
corporate law.216 Indeed, one Senator opposed Douglas' nomination
to the Court on the ground that he had not made public his views
on the rights of labor and civil liberties.21 7 Nevertheless, it is possible
to infer a gradual shift of emphasis from his earlier writings. In
1934, he used the word "fascist" to describe the powers he recom-
mended should be given to security holders' committees in railroad
reorganizations. 218 Not yet alive to the implications of fascism, he nev-
ertheless supported the underprivileged. The significance of the Se-
211. 309 U.S. 227, 236 (1940).
212. Id. at 241.
213. G. DUNNE, HUGO BLACK AND THE JUDICIAL REVOLUTION 325 (1977).
214. Snowiss, The Legacy of Justice Black, 1973 Sup. CT. REv. 187, 194-95, 197. In
Black's view, de jure racial inequality and deprivation of voting rights violated clear
constitutional guarantees. Id. at 194-95.
215. Id. at 195, 240. But see id. at 246 (later in Black's career, fear that protest would
degenerate into mob violence challenged earlier confidence in self-regulating marketplace
of ideas).
216. See J. SIMON, supra note 105, at 89-90, 105, 132-33.
217. 84 CONG. REc. 3710-11 (1939) (remarks of Sen. Frazier).
218. Douglas argued in a draft of an article that security holders' protective com-
mittees should have "a fascist power." Letter from William 0. Douglas to Jerome Frank
(Jan. 3, 1934) (attaching draft of manuscript) (Jerome Frank Papers, Box 11, Folder 72,
Yale University Archives). The term was deleted in the published version of the article.
See Douglas, Protective Committees in Railroad Reorganizations, 47 HxAv. L. Rav. 565, 569
(1934).
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curities Act, he wrote during the same year, was that government at
last was "taking the side of the helpless, the suckers, the underdogs." 210,
Two years later, he linked the need for strong government control
over corporate power to averting the threat of totalitarianism. With-
out such control, the "forces of exploitation" would "breed insecurity"
and ultimately despotism. 2 20 The submergence of individuals into large
impersonal corporations in this country and into the state abroad, he
stated just prior to joining the Court in 1939, led to preoccupation
with "materialistic and mechanistic matters" and destroyed the spiri-
tual and ethical values upon which democracy was based.221
In 1940, Douglas turned his attention to broader issues relating to
the survival of democracy. Aware of the observations of current af-
fairs made by people like Dorothy Thompson,222 he warned that,
abroad, the world was being "overrun by relentless force" and freedom
was being "snuffed out by sheer might."223 At home, he wrote to a
friend, the country was experiencing "terribly dangerous days . . .
such as only Lincoln saw."224 He soon articulated an analysis that
echoed very clearly the new consensus about the dangers of minority
persecution. In a speech delivered to the Association of the Bar of
the City of New York in 1940, Douglas spelled out his vision of the
disintegration of democracy in the face of unrestrained majoritarian-
ism. Once an inferior grade of citizenship has been allowed in a na-
tion, he warned, the "downward spiral of disunity" leads to "hate and
intolerance" and "the enemies of democracy invariably have risen
to power."
Every nonconformist who is beaten, every practitioner of the right
of free speech who is jailed, every unpopular exponent of a re-
ligious faith who is deprived of his constitutional rights brings
every free man a step closer to incarceration or punishment, or
discreet and frightened conformity. Infraction of the Bill of Rights
knows no terminal points. We know from the experience of other
peoples that what starts as suppression of an unpopular minority
swings as easily to persecutions on the right or on the left, until
few can afford to be nonconformists.
22 5
219. Douglas, Protecting the Investor, 23 YALE REV. 521, 522 (1934); see J. SIMON,
supra note 105, at 132-33.
220. W. DOUGLAS, supra note 81, at I (address delivered Oct. 20, 1936).
221. W. DOUGLAS, The Democratic Ideal, in DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE 290, 290-96 (1940)
(address delivered Feb. 9, 1939).
222. Letter from William 0. Douglas to Howard McNeely (Oct. 29, 1940) (William
0. Douglas Papers, Box 29, Library of Congress).
223. W. Douglas, To What Is This a Commencement? reprinted in 86 CONG. REC. 3962
app. (1940) (address delivered June 16, 1940).
224. Letter from William 0. Douglas to Howard McNeely, supra note 222.
225. W. DOUGLAS, An Age Coming to Birth, in BEING AN AMERICAN 72, 76 (1948) (ad-
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Joined with the abhorrence to group persecution in Douglas' thought
was another theme-the sanctity of the nonconformist. In other state-
ments of this period, he stressed the need to protect not only racial
and religious minorities, but above all, the individual conscience, "the
smallest minority of all."2 26 As he had emphasized before, the indi-
vidual was the repository of the cultural and spiritual values upon
which democracy rested. Coercive conformity, Douglas believed, de-
stroyed democracy by destroying individual freedom.227
This view of democracy led Douglas to part ways with Stone and
Frankfurter 228 with regard to the justification for protecting civil
liberties. Although he acknowledged the function of rights such as
free speech in informing the political process, he rejected the notion
that "[t]he minority or the dissenter" is "limited to performance of
a political function." 229 Freedom for the individual conscience de-
served absolute protection in order to preserve the values that made
democracy possible, and not simply to promote the discovery of po-
litical truth or the stability of society.
23 0
F. An Emerging Consensus
Further research would probably show that the views of other Jus-
tices were influenced by contemporary discussions about democracy,
dictatorship, and group conflict. Owen Roberts, in Hague v. CIO,
23
1
upheld a challenge to Mayor Hague's notorious dictatorial control over
Jersey City and mandated that government was required to permit
dress delivered Dec. 2, 1940). Douglas consistently condemned the persecution of minority
groups. See Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115-16 (1943) (striking down license
taxes on canvassers, partly because of potential for suppressing minorities). In 1944, he
warned students at the National Police Academy that the suppression of one minority
would precipitate the suppression of others and bring on totalitarianism, and he urged
them to have the courage to stand "between an aroused community and an unpopular
minority or a suspected person." W. DOUGLAS, The Police and Civil Liberties, in BEING
AN AMERICAN 106, 109 (1948) (address delivered Oct. 28, 1944). The following year, he
noted instances of community persecution of religious minorities and of free speech and
urged audiences to take steps to ensure that hatred directed against racial, religious,
and political minorities did not spread in this country. W. DOUGLAS, Justice for All, in
BEING AN AMERICAN 113, 114 (1948) (address delivered Nov. 28, 1945).
226. W. DouGLAs, The Jefferson Philosophy, in BEING AN AMERICAN 16, 17 (1948) (ad-
dress delivered June 6, 1943) [hereinafter cited as Douglas-Jefferson Philosophy]; W.
DOUGLAS, A Nation of Minorities, in BEING AN AMERICAN 34, 34 (1948) (address delivered
Mar. 1, 1943) [hereinafter cited as Douglas-Nation of Minorities].
227. Douglas-Jefferson Philosophy, supra note 226, at 17-19; Douglas-Nation of Mi-
norities, supra note 226, at 34-36.
228. See pp. 764, 770 supra (views of Stone and Frankfurter).
229. Douglas-Jefferson Philosophy, suPra note 226, at 17.
230. Id. at 17-19; Douglas-Nation of Minorities, supra note 226, at 34-35.
231. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
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free expression in public places, 232 and in Cantwell v. Connecticut,233
protected the rights of Jehovah's Witnesses to proselytize on the public
streets.23 4 Stanley Reed evinced a concern for race relations in his
correspondence 235 and wrote in 1941 that the maintenance of free
speech would make possible the "adjustment of social relations through
reason. ' 230 Wiley Rutledge joined Murphy's civil liberties positions
more often than any other member of the Court.
237
The writings, addresses, and opinions of the Justices sitting dur-
ing the 1940 term demonstrate the apparent emergence of a consensus
on the Court that roughly paralleled the developing contemporary
ideology. Nevertheless, the origins and significance of this consensus
must be kept in perspective. As has already been noted, concern about
minorities has always been part of one standard critique of democracy
and was forcefully articulated by conservatives such as Sutherland dur-
ing the Progressive era. Furthermore, as Professor Cover has noted,
the modern concept of minorities has roots in the international treaties
of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and in the accompany-
ing literature, 2 3  and it also gained currency in the administration
of federal benefit programs during the New Deal.23 9 The sociological
theory of in-groups and out-groups undoubtedly contributed to the
notion that persecution of a group is more likely to arise from its iso-
lation, as the writings of Lusky and Benedict indicate. 240 In addition,
for some, if not all, of the Justices, awareness of the plight of blacks
in this country preceded the developments of the late 1930S.241
It is therefore not contended here that popular columnists like Lipp-
mann and Thompson, authors like Raushenbush and Schuman, or
232. Id. at 515-16 (Roberts, J.); see p. 757 & note 106 supra (discussion of Hague
v. CIO).
233. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
234. Id. at 304-11 (Roberts, J.).
235. See Letter from Stanley Reed to Felix Frankfurter (July 26, 1941) (Felix Frank-
furter Papers, Box 92, File 1921, Library of Congress) (discussing segregation and Recon-
struction Civil Rights Cases); Letter from Stanley Reed to Felix Frankfurter (July 6,
1943) (Felix Frankfurter Papers, Box 92, File 1922, Library of Congress) (discussing proper
approach in Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944), in which certiorari had recently
been granted).
236. Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U.S. 287, 320 (1941)
(Reed, J., dissenting).
237. C. PmrcHETT, supra note 1, at 130-31.
238. Cover, supra note 3.
239. Id.
240. R. BENEDICT, sura note 90, at 249-55; Lusky, sura note 114, at 2; see S. RAUSKEN-
BusH, sura note 84, at 329; Miller, supra note 84, at i. On the sociological theory of
in-groups and out-groups, see R. MERTON, SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE 183-93
(1949); W. SUMNER, FOLKWAYS 12-13, 498-500 (1906).
241. See p. 768 supra (Frankfurter); note 179 supra (Murphy); p. 774 supra (Black).
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events in Europe directly caused the heightened concern by the Court
for the protection of civil liberties and minorities. Judicial trends are
not so easily explained, and it is unlikely that so permanent a shift
as the special concern of the postwar Court for minorities would have
persisted had it not been reinforced by other sources.
Nevertheless, the views expressed by the early Roosevelt Court
showed the impact of contemporary intellectual currents and reflected
a significant change. The concern for minorities ranged across a far
broader spectrum of opinion than the narrow conservatism of Suther-
land and his cohorts. The defining characteristics of those groups de-
serving special judicial protection shifted from wealth and geography
to race, religion, and ethnic background. In this respect, Stone's phrase
"discrete and insular minorities" distinguishes the emerging consensus
from the preceding conservative view. Moreover, the Justices of the
Roosevelt Court, along with their generation, witnessed events at
home and abroad that gave specific content to their concern for the
fate of minorities. Stone altered his thinking in light of contemporary
events and analyses, and several of the newly appointed Justices ap-
pear to have developed a new or intensified concern in the late 1930s
for the integrity of civil liberties and for the safety of minorities. The
parallel intellectual evolution of a number of Justices suggests the
influence of contemporary popular concern about majoritarianism
and the fate of minorities.
The newly crystallized analysis of democracy could affect the Roose-
velt Court's decisionmaking only by shaping the incremental devel-
opment of doctrine, case by case. Although agreeing on the contours
of the problems facing democracy, the Justices did not always share
the same view of the appropriate solutions. Therefore, the Court's
decisions affecting minorities or civil liberties necessarily varied with
the legal context and with the Justices who formed majorities in par-
ticular cases. 242 The gradual manner in which the new concern about
minorities matured into a doctrinal basis for constitutional adjudi-
cation is the subject of the balance of this article.
III. The Department of Justice and the
Protection of Civil Liberties
The Court's opportunity to give legal expression to the emerging
consensus depended on the specific controversies litigated before the
242. In some 77 cases involving issues of civil liberties during the period from Feb-
ruary 1940 to the spring of 1946, 45 decisions were rendered by a split Court. Barnett,
supra note 198, at 179 n.8; see id. at 220-21 (general agreement on Court's role but dis-
agreement in particular cases).
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Court. It is therefore significant that groups with relatively pro-
grammatic litigation strategies were bringing civil liberties claims to
the Court with increasing frequency during this period. The per-
sistent efforts of Hayden Covington and Joseph Rutherford on be-
half of Jehovah's Witnesses243 led Harlan Fiske Stone to suggest half-
seriously that the Witnesses should be given an endowment "in view
of the aid which they give in solving the legal problems of civil
liberties." 244 The NAACP's long-run litigation program in the federal
courts during the 1930s and 1940s has been extensively chronicled.2 45
In the late 1930s, a change in orientation by the Department of Jus-
tice towards increased federal protection of the political process and
of minorities also brought civil liberties cases-including United States
v. Classic-to the Court for decision. Officials in the Justice Department
were apparently motivated by the same concerns about the suppres-
sion of minorities and the preservation of democracy that moved many
members of the Court.
A. Expansion of Federal Activity
During Roosevelt's second term, the Department of Justice began
to experiment with using the federal civil rights statutes that had
survived the late nineteenth-century retreat from Reconstruction 24 6
to fight political corruption and to consolidate the legislative accom-
plishments of the New Deal. In 1937, an extensive federal prosecu-
tion was brought against members of the Democratic machine in Kan-
sas City, Missouri, for violating civil rights by tampering with ballots
in the 1936 presidential election.2 47 A celebrated prosecution was in-
stituted the following year in Harlan County, Kentucky, against more
243. Covington, often assisted by Rutherford, argued or participated in the follow-
ing decisions: Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296 (1940); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
315 U.S. 568 (1942); Jones v. Opelika, 316 US. 584 (1942); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413
(1943); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943); Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141
(1943); West Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Prince v. Massachusetts,
321 U.S. 158 (1944); Follett v. McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944); Marsh v. Alabama, 326
U.S. 501 (1946); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948).
244. Note from Harlan F. Stone to Charles Evans Hughes (Mar. 24, 1941) (Harlan Fiske
Stone Papers, Box 75, Library of Congress).
245. R. KLUGER, supra note 165, at 126-284; M. Tushnet, Organizational Structure and
Legal Strategy: The NAACP's Campaign Against Segregated Education, 1925-1950 (un-
published draft, University of Wisconsin) (on file with Yale Law Journal).
246. See pp. 784-86 infra.
247. Walker v. United States, 92 F.2d 383 (8th Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 303 U.S. 644
(1938); Luteran v. United States, 93 F.2d 395 (8th Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 303 U.S. 644
(1938); Little v. United States, 93 F.2d 401 (8th Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 303 U.S. 644 (1938);
Neeper v. United States, 93 F.2d 409 (8th Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 303 U.S. 644 (1938); Car-
tello v. United States, 93 F.2d 412 (8th Cir. 1937).
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than twenty coal mining companies and more than forty individuals
accused of conspiring to prevent employees from exercising their right
to organize under the National Labor Relations Act.248 Federal prose-
cutors unsuccessfully attempted to obtain a grand jury indictment of
Mayor Hague for his expulsion of CIO organizers from Jersey City.249
Another prosecution was initiated against the Kansas City machine,250
and investigations into the Chicago machine and the Hague machine
continued. 251 Prosecutions under the federal anti-peonage statutes
252
were commenced, almost all in the South, on behalf of farm tenants,
usually black, against white farmers.
253
Federal efforts on behalf of civil liberties and minority rights re-
ceived a boost with the appointment of Frank Murphy as Attorney
General in 1939. After consultations with members of the ACLU and
with Lee Pressman, counsel for the CIO, Murphy ordered the for-
mation of the Civil Liberties Unit on February 3, 1939.254 Later
renamed the Civil Rights Section, 255 and ultimately the Civil Rights
Division, the unit was part of the Criminal Division of the Justice
Department and initially included a dozen lawyers. Henry A. Schwein-
haut, who had been active in the attempt to indict Frank Hague and
in the Harlan County prosecution, was named to head it.256 0. John
Rogge, brought into the Department by Murphy to head the Criminal
Division in May 1939, took a keen interest in the activities of the
section.257 Although Rogge himself was primarily interested in pros-
ecuting political corruption, he ordered two of the Section's attor-
neys, Albert Arent and Irwin Langbein, to prepare a lengthy memo-
randum on possible uses of the civil rights statutes to protect the
civil liberties of individuals and minorities.258 Rogge then circulated
this memorandum to all of the United States Attorneys as a guide.
This document helped to stimulate prosecutorial activities in addi-
248. United States v. Mary Helen Coal Corp. (E.D. Ky. 1938) (unreported) (prosecu-
tion ended in hung jury); see [1938] ATr'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 81; [1939] ATr'Y GEN. ANN.
REp. 63; R. CAm supra note 193, at 27 n.38, 67-68 & n.29.
249. J. HowARD, suPra note 179, at 204.
250. Id. at 194-95.
251. Interview with 0. John Rogge, former Assistant Attorney General in charge of
Criminal Division, by telephone (Dec. 31, 1980).
252. Act of March 2, 1867, ch. 187, 14 Stat. 546 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1994
(1976), 18 U.S.C. § 1581 (1976)).
253. See [1937] ATT'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 80-81; [1938] ATr' GEN. ANN. REP. 81; [1941]
ATr'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 99.
254. J. HowARD, suPra note 179, at 203-04.
255. R. CA, suPra note 193, at 24 n.35.
256. N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 1939, § 1, at 2, col. 2.
257. Interview with 0. John Rogge, supra note 251.
258. Id.; see R. CAp, supra note 193, at 33.
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tion to those initiated directly by the Department in Washington,
D.C. 2 5 9
The Justice Department used the civil rights statutes to prosecute
in a number of cases of violence against minorities. In a forerunner
of Screws v. United States,260 a Georgia policeman was charged with
violating the civil rights of a black man by torturing him to obtain
a confession.261 The Department sought indictments in connection
with anti-black violence in Detroit and lynchings in Sikeston, Mis-
souri, and other cities262 and prosecuted local officials whose coop-
eration or acquiescence contributed to the wave of violence against
Jehovah's Witnesses that followed the Court's decision in Gobiti. 263
Prosecutions were also brought for deprivations of other individual
civil rights. In Alabama, persons were convicted for infringing the
right of free speech and press of a newspaper editor,264 and a Louisiana
policeman was indicted for depriving a photographer of his means of
livelihood by forcibly preventing him from taking photographs at a
polling booth.26
5
The emergence of interest in expanded federal protection of civil
rights may be attributed to several factors. It undoubtedly owed its
genesis in part to the New Deal's general confidence in the expansion
of federal power. The need for the Roosevelt administration to re-
259. Interview with 0. John Rogge, supra note 251.
260. 325 U.S. 91 (1945) (sustaining conviction of sheriff under federal civil rights
statutes for beating prisoner to death).
261. United States v. Sutherland, 37 F. Supp. 344 (N.D. Ga. 1940); see Brief for the
United States at 45 n.25, United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941); [1940] ATr'Y GEN.
ANN. REP. 77; R. CARat, suPra note 193, at 151-54.
262. R. CARR, supra note 193, at 163-76; Rotnem, Clarifications of the Civil Rights'
Statutes, 2 BILL RIGHTS REv. 252, 260 (1942) [hereinafter cited as Rotnein-Clarifications];
Rotnem, The Federal Civil Right "Not To Be Lynched", 28 WASH. U. L.Q. 57 (1943)
[hereinafter cited as Rotnem-Federal Right].
The Department also joined a black Congressman from Illinois before the Supreme
Court in his successful challenge to the Interstate Commerce Commission's acceptance of
segregated and unequal railroad passenger facilities. Mitchell v. United States, 313 U.S.
80, 88 (1941) (statutory construction of Interstate Commerce Act); see F. BIDDLE, IN BRIEF
AUTHORITY 152-53 (1962); R. KLUGER, supra note 165, at 220.
263. Catlette v. United States, 132 F.2d 902 (4th Cir. 1943); Rotnem & Folsom, supra
note 105, at 1061; see p. 766 & note 154 supra (discussion of Gobitis decision).
264. The conviction was reversed. Powe v. United States, 109 F.2d 147 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 309 U.S. 679 (1940) (Congress lacks power to prohibit private infringement
of free press).
265. United States v. Cowan (E.D. La. 1940) (unreported). The theory behind the
prosecution showed the creative use that the Department of Justice intended to make
of the civil rights statutes. The indictment alleged that the officer had deprived the
victim of the right, protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, to pursue his livelihood,
photography. Despite the novelty of the government's theory, the indictment survived
a demurrer. Interview with 0. John Rogge, supra note 251; see Brief for the United States
at 45 n.25, United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941). The defendant was later acquitted.
[1941] ATr'y GEN. ANN. REP. 98; R. CARR, supra note 193, at 86 n.2.
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spond to the demands of the New Deal coalition also accounted for
some of the increased activity on behalf of labor and blacks.2 6 Ef-
forts to assist the latter, however, were necessarily tempered by the
influence of the Southern wing of the Democratic Party, which formed
a crucial part of the coalition and also dominated the Senate Judi-
ciary Committee.26 7 Once the country entered World War Two, propa-
ganda and morale needs made it imperative to control the more vio-
lent manifestations of racism.208 Furthermore, the tilt of the Court
in favor of protecting civil liberties and minorities may have encour-
aged litigation that previously would have had little chance of success.
Finally, the shift within the Department appears in part to have
been stimulated by simple idealism and by the heightened awareness
of the dangers of group conflict that was central to the emerging con-
temporary ideology. The creation of a separate unit to protect civil
rights, Murphy stated shortly after he became Attorney General, was
necessary because "social unrest" had increased the need to protect
the civil liberties of "protesting and insecure people." 269, In 1944, At-
torney General Biddle explained the new attention to civil liberties
in part as a response "to the challenge of the ideals of democracy made
by the new idealogies [sic] of Fascism and Communism."270 Rogge
assumed control of the Criminal Division with the express intent of
cleaning up political corruption and straightening out the country.27'
Several officials associated with the Civil Rights Section, including
Rogge, Victor Rotnem, and Fred Folsom, Jr., wrote articles describ-
ing actions taken by the section to protect the rights of minorities
identified by race,272 religion,273  and economic status.27 4 Rotnem
266. Interview with Herbert Wechsler, former assistant to Solicitor General Biddle,
by telephone (Nov. 25, 1980). The interest in civil rights of some members of the Roose-
velt administration did not go unnoticed in the late 1930s. During the fight over the
Court plan, for instance, arch-conservative Senator Carter Glass of Virginia delivered a
radio address opposing the plan and attacking those New Deal "incendiaries" who ad-
vocated the repeal of segregation and increased federal enforcement of the Civil War
amendments. N.Y. Times, Mar. 30, 1937, § 1, at 16, col. 1.
267. R. KLUGER, supra note 165, at 234; Interview with Herbert Wechsler, supra note
266.
268. F. BIDDLE, supra note 262, at 155-56; F. Biddle, Civil Rights and the Federal Law
at 23-24 (unpublished lecture delivered at Cornell University, Oct. 4, 1944); Rotnem-
Clarifications, supra note 262, at 260; Rotnem-Federal Right, supra note 262, at 58.
269. R. CAR, supra note 193, at 25; N.Y. Times, Jan. 26, 1939, § 1, at 13, col. 1.
270. Biddle, supra note 268, at 21. Like Frankfurter, Biddle was a member of the
Board of Directors of Survey Associates. See 28 Sutvzy GRAPHic 51 (1939).
271. Interview with 0. John Rogge, supra note 251.
272. Rotnem-Federal Right, supra note 262.
273. Rotnem-Clarifications, supra note 262, at 260; Rotnem & Folsom, supra note
105, at 1061.
274. Rogge, Justice and Civil Liberties, 25 A.B.A.J. 1030, 1031 (1939). The annual
reports of the Attorney General during this period also show that civil liberties prose-
cutions focused on the South, that section of the country that was plagued both by the
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stressed that federal intervention in cases of racial violence was jus-
tified by the perceived failure of state and local law enforcement of-
ficials to take steps to control or punish such violence. 75 The section
was also particularly interested in extending the civil rights statutes
to cover a variety of interferences with electoral rights.276
B. The Civil Rights Statutes
The determination to use federal law enforcement power to pro-
tect politically powerless groups from oppression was hamstrung by
an inadequate statutory arsenal. Although the federal government could
sometimes prosecute wrongdoers for violating federal statutes impos-
ing taxes and regulating interstate commerce, these surrogate civil
rights prosecutions were inefficient and considered hypocritical by
some federal officials.277 Sections 19278 and 20279 of the Criminal Code
of 1909 were therefore the mainstays of the federal effort to combat
the mistreatment of minorities.
Both statutes had serious limitations as practical tools for the de-
fense of civil rights. By virtue of their broad coverage, both were
vulnerable to challenge on grounds of vagueness. In addition, many
of the outrages the Department wished to prosecute were committed
by private persons.280 Section 20281 applied only to the deprivation
breakdown of democratic government and by racial violence. [1937] ATr'Y GEN. ANN.
Rr. 80-81; [1938J ATr'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 81; [1940] ATr'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 77; [1941] ATr'Y
GEN. ANN. REP. 98-100.
275. Rotnem-Federal Right, supra note 262, at 59-60. A book written by Robert Carr
in 1947, relying in part on interviews with former members of the Department, similarly
justified the need for federal intervention to protect ciVil rights in terms analogous to
the third paragraph of footnote four. Unpopular, powerless groups that were the vic-
tims of private action, Carr explained, generally lacked political strength at the state
or local level and could find protection only from the federal government. R. CAR, supra
note 193, at 21-22.
276. R. CARR, sutra note 193, at 64; see Rogge, sutra note 274, at 1030.
277. See, for example, Robert Jackson's reaction to the prosecutions under such stat-
utes by then-Attorney General Murphy. E. GEmART, AMERICA'S AnvocAm 186-87 (1958).
278. Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 19, 35 Stat. 1088 (current version at 18 U.S.C.
§ 241 (1976)) [hereinafter referred to as Section 19].
279. Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 20, 35 Stat. 1088 (current version at 18 U.S.C.
§ 242 (1976)) [hereinafter referred to as Section 20].
280. Rotnem, Criminal Enforcement of Federal Civil Rights, LAw. GUILD REv., May
1942, at 18, 18.
281. Section 20 provided:
Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, will-
fully subjects, or causes to be subjected, an inhabitant of any State, Territory, or
District to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or pro.
tected by the Constitution and laws of the United States, or to different punishments,
pains, or penalties, on account of such inhabitant being an alien, or by reason of his
color, or race, than are prescribed for the punishment of citizens, shall be fined not
more than one thousand dollars or imprisoned not more than one year or both.
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of legal or constitutional rights "under color of any law," and argu-
ably only to actions authorized by state law.28 2 It was also unclear
whether the section was limited to deprivations of rights "on account"
of alienage or race.283 Until early 1941, Section 20 had been used
in only four known cases. 28 4 Section 19,215 which had been used more
often, applied to private persons but was correspondingly limited. It
prohibited conspiracies to prevent the enjoyment of rights secured
by the Constitution or federal statute. Only a few constitutional rights
were protected against private action, 28 6 including the right to vote, -28 7
the right to have that vote counted as cast,288 and according to a dic-
tum in United States v. Cruikshank, the right to assemble and petition
the federal government. 28 9 Some federal statutes secured rights against
private interference, such as labor's right to organize, which had been
infringed in Harlan County.2 90
Many private wrongs appeared to be beyond the limited scope of
Section 19, were missed entirely by Section 20, and therefore seemed
beyond the Department's grasp unless they violated specific federal
statutes such as the anti-peonage laws.291 Soon after its creation, the
Civil Rights Section began assessing possible means of overcoming these
282. During this period, the meaning of "under color of law" created persistent con-
fusion in the context of civil actions under the predecessor of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See, e.g.,
Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1944) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Barney v. City
of New York, 193 U.S. 430, 437-41 (1904). See generally P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO,
& H. WECHSLER, HART AND NVECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 937-
51 (2d ed. 1973).
283. Rogge, supra note 274, at 1030.
284. Brief for the United States at 45, United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941)
(two unreported cases in 1940, case in 1911, and case in 1882).
285. Section 19 provided in pertinent part:
If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any
citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him
by the Constitution or laws of the United States . . . they shall be fined not more
than five thousand dollars and imprisoned not more than ten years, and shall, more-
over, be thereafter ineligible to any office, or place of honor, profit, or trust created
by the Constitution or laws of the United States.
286. In 1939, these included the right to be free from slavery; the right to accept
federal office and perform the duties of that office, United States v. Patrick, 54 F. 338
(M.D. Tenn. 1893); the right to inform a federal officer of crimes against the United
States, Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458 (1900); the right to be free from mob vio-
lence while being held by a federal officer, Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263 (1892);
the right to be a witness and to be protected as such when giving testimony before a
federal court, Foss v. United States, 266 F. 881 (9th Cir. 1920); and the right to enjoy
execution of a federal court order in one's favor, United States v. Lancaster, 44 F. 885
(W.D. Ga. 1890).
287. Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884).
288. United States v. Mosley, 238 US. 383 (1915).
289. 92 U.S. 542, 552-53 (1875).
290. R. CARR, supra note 193, at 27 & n.38; see p. 781 supra.
291. See note 252 supra.
785
The Yale Law Journal
limitations. One proposed doctrinal approach was to expand the reach
of Section 19 by relying on the Cruikshank dictum, which suggested
that the Constitution prohibited private interference with all rights
that were "essential to the independent existence and functioning"
of the federal government. 92 Another possible approach was to ar-
gue that if a state official, motivated by the victim's race, religion,
or political views, failed to protect a person from private mistreatment,
the inaction deprived the victim of the right of equal protection and
was therefore punishable under Section 20.293 If used creatively, this
equal protection analysis would enable Section 20 to reach many wrongs
that were otherwise beyond its reach. Finally, Rotnem argued that
lynch mobs violated a constitutional right by preventing the victim
from asserting his right to a fair trial.294
By the early 1940s, then, it appears that officials within the De-
partment of Justice, particularly in the Civil Rights Section, were
acting upon a perspective similar to that emerging on the Court. The
Department was determined to control the more flagrant manifesta-
tions of group prejudice. Department attorneys believed that affir-
mative federal action was necessary to compensate for the breakdown
of state and local government protection resulting from the power-
lessness of hated minorities-an analysis parallel to that found in foot-
note four of Carolene Products. To achieve its goals, the Department
needed to erode the immunity from federal law traditionally accorded
to private action that violated civil rights.
IV. Election Law and the New Ideology
United States v. Classic,295 a prosecution by the Justice Department,
challenged the Supreme Court to implement the new ideology in the
context of election law. Election law is an important testing ground
for constitutional theory, both because it directly affects the process
of self-rule and because it often involves conflicts between principles
that lie at the heart of constitutional, representative government. 296
The choice between principles in a particular election law case will
often have an unusually direct relationship to the Court's underlying
292. Rogge, supra note 274, at 1030; see p. 785 supra.
293. Rotnem-Clarifications, supra note 262, at 259-60.
294. Rotnemn-Federal Right, supra note 262, at 61-70.
295. 313 US. 299 (1941).
296. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 US. 1 (1976) (free speech versus equal oppor-
tunity to participate regardless of wealth); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (majority
rule versus values of federalism); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (effective black
political participation versus autonomy of private associational activity).
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assumptions about the nature of democracy. For this reason, the line
of voters' rights cases has been compared to an archeological cross-sec-
tion in which different doctrinal strata reflect a process of ideological
and cultural change.2 97 Classic, decided during the period when the
new ideology was gaining acceptance by the Court, dramatically il-
lustrates the process of change.
A. Judicial Protection of Private Political Activity
The significance of Classic can only be understood, however, in the
context of the Court's prior treatment of voting rights cases. Two
central issues were implicated in Classic: the scope of federal regula-
tion of the electoral process, and the legality of excluding blacks from
the political process by means of the white primary.
1. Newberry: Keeping the Party Private
Federal intervention in the electoral process began in earnest dur-
ing Reconstruction, 29 and after some early resistance,299 the Court
came to support the federal effort to impose order on Southern poli-
tics. In Ex parte Yarbrough,300 an 1884 decision, the Court held that
the federal government had the power under the Constitution and
Section 19 of the Criminal Code to prevent intimidation of voters
in federal elections. The opinion in Yarbrough was notable not only
for its holding but also for its impassioned defense of federal protec-
tion of the electoral process against Southern violence and against
the corruption in the rest of the country that resulted from the "vast
growth of wealth."301 The Court reaffirmed its position in 1915 in
United States v. Mosley,302 holding that the right to vote for federal
office and to have that vote counted was a right secured by the Con-
stitution.
Mosley was quickly followed, however, by three decisions that con-
siderably narrowed federal power to act against electoral corruption.
In United States v. Gradwell,30 3 the Court held that bribery of voters
and procurement of unqualified voters in a West Virginia Republican
297. Claude, Constitutional Voting Rights and Early US. Supreme Court Doctrine,
51 J. NEGRO HIsT. 114, 114 (1966).
298. See generally H. CUMMINGS & C. McFAPLAND, FEDRAL JUSTcE 230-49 (1937).
299. See United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875); United States v. Reese, 92
U.S. 214 (1875); Claude, suPra note 297.
300. 110 U.S. 651 (1884).
301. Id. at 667.
302. 238 U.S. 383 (1915).
303. 243 U.S. 476 (1917).
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senatorial primary were not crimes under Section 19. The Court rea-
soned that only the rights of the losing candidate had been violated,
and that the right to be a candidate in a primary was derived from
state law, not federal law or the Constitution. 04 In United States v.
Bathgate,30 5 decided the following year, the Court held that bribery
of voters in a general election was also beyond the scope of Section
19 because it did not infringe the personal constitutional right to
vote and have the vote counted. 80 6
The third case curtailing federal control over the electoral process
was Newberry v. United States,307 decided in 1921. Unlike the two
previous cases, which turned on statutory construction, Newberry
was decided on constitutional grounds. The defendant, the successful
candidate for the Senate from Michigan, was charged with violating
the federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1910308 by exceeding spending
limits imposed on primary campaigns. In sustaining a demurrer to
the indictment, the plurality opinion of Justice McReynolds held
that regulation of primary elections was beyond the power conferred
on Congress by Article I, Section 4, of the Constitution.300 McRey-
nolds argued that primaries were merely methods by which adherents
chose a candidate to compete at the general election and therefore
were not "elections" within the meaning of Article I, Section 4.310
He acknowledged the practical importance of the primary, but dis-
missed it as irrelevant:
Many things are prerequisites to elections or may affect their
outcome-voters, education, means of transportation, health, pub-
lic discussion, immigration, private animosities, even the face and
figure of the candidate; but authority to regulate the manner
of holding them gives no right to control any of these.31'
McReynolds concluded by noting that the states had police power over
abuses at primary elections or conventions, and that Congress' power
304. Id. at 488. The Court did not, however, decide whether a primary was an elec-
tion within the meaning of the Constitution. Id.
305. 246 U.S. 220 (1918).
306. Id. at 226-27.
307. 256 U.S. 232 (1921).
308. Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 392, 36 Stat. 822, as amended by Act of Aug. 19, 1911,
ch. 33, 37 Star. 25 (repealed 1925).
309. Article I, Section 4, provides: "The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elec-
tions for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legisla-
ture thereof; but Congress may at any time make or alter such Regulations, except as
to the Places of chusing Senators." See Corwin, Constitutional Law in 1920-1, I, 16 Am.
POLITICAL Sci. REv. 22, 25 (1922) (McReynolds' reading of Section 4 "unanswered and
probably unanswerable").
310. 256 U.S. 232, 250 (1921).
311. Id. at 257.
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over general elections gave it sufficient power to protect itself against
corruption.312 Newberry completed the retreat from broad federal
supervision of the electoral process. 313 Primary elections, the Court
maintained, were "purely domestic affairs" of the states,314 beyond
the constitutional powers of Congress. Newberry's narrow construc-
tion of Article I, Section 4, restricted congressional power over elec-
tions to regulation of the process of balloting in the general election
and specifically excluded federal protection of public discussion per-
tinent to the election.
The limitation of federal power over elections may have reflected
the Court's attachment to the value of autonomy from government.31 5
Although curtailing the government's supervisory power over elec-
toral politics would leave the electoral process more vulnerable to
corruption, it would also free candidates and political parties from
governmental interference in their political activities and nominating
processes. This resistance to government intervention in the political
process was consistent with the general laissez-faire trend of decision-
making by the Court in economic matters during the 1920s. So long
as government was perceived as the greatest threat to liberty, protec-
tion of the private political sphere would have priority.
2. Grovey: Keeping the Party White
A similar impetus can be discerned in the Court's treatment of
the white primary from 1927 to 1935. The white primary developed
in the early years of this century as one of the most effective means
of excluding blacks from any political power in the South.316 The
Democratic Party was the only significant political party in that re-
gion. Exclusion of blacks from its "private" primary elections was
therefore de facto disenfranchisement. Preoccupation with excluding
blacks from voting had several deleterious effects on the political pro-
312. Id. at 258.
313. In three cases decided after Newberry, the Court upheld federal control over
election-related matters, but in each case it relied on a specific basis for federal power.
Barry v. United States, 279 U.S. 597 (1929) (Senate power to compel witnesses to testify
in investigations concerning corruption in primaries); United States v. Wurzbach, 280
U.S. 396 (1930) (Corrupt Practices Act regulating contributions by federal employees in
primary campaigns); Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534 (1934) (federal statute
regulating interstate committees created to influence presidential elections).
314. 256 U.S. 232, 258 (1921).
315. The Newberry opinion concludes that the power to regulate primaries would
"infringe upon liberties reserved to the people." Id. Hughes' argument for the defendant
stressed this theme, asserting that Article I, Section 4, did not intend "to detract from
the freedom of the people of the States with respect to their political activities." Id. at
234; see id. at 236, 238.
316. See V. KEy, SouTHER PoumTcs 619-20 (1949).
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cess in the South, including low voter turnouts, dulling of the issues,
strong party control by stable cliques, and the divorce of state from
national politics.
3 17
To preserve the system, it was necessary to discourage any attempt
by a Democratic faction to "cheat" by appealing to the black vote.318
An effort to enlist the power of the state in the enforcement of the
system initiated the direct involvement of the Supreme Court with
the white primary.319 When one Democratic faction in Texas appealed
to black voters, the other obtained state legislation prohibiting blacks
from voting in Democratic primary elections. In Nixon v. Herndon,
3 20
the Court unanimously struck down the Texas statute as a violation
of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Holmes,
the author of the Court's opinion, described the case as a "very plain
one. " 321 Because the statute presented such a "direct and obvious"
infringement of the Fourteenth Amendment, Holmes deemed con-
sideration of the Fifteenth Amendment unnecessary.322 Holmes there-
by avoided any conflict with Newberry on the question of whether
the right to vote was implicated in a primary.
The Texas legislature responded to Herndon almost immediately
with a new statute giving the state executive committee of each po-
litical party the power to prescribe qualifications for party member-
ship. The Democratic state executive committee in turn barred blacks
from membership. In Nixon v. Condon, 23 this action was also chal-
lenged on Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment grounds. This time,
the Court had to decide whether there was sufficient delegation of
317. Id. at 506-08.
318. A "liberal" defense of the white primary was that it was better for all con-
cerned to exclude blacks from politics than to "use" them for political purposes. See, e.g.,
Weeks, The White Primary, 8 Miss. L.J. 135, 136 (1935). The exclusion of blacks was
reinforced by the extralegal method of "white terror." See G. MYRDAL, AN AMEICAN
DILEMMA 485-86 (1944).
319. See V. KY, supra note 316, at 621-24.
320. 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
321. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., to Harold Laski (Mar. 17, 1927), reprinted
in 2 HOLMES-LASKi LEwERs 927 (M. Howe ed. 1953).
322. 273 U.S. 536, 540-41 (1927). When the opinion in Herndon was read from the
bench, Holmes stated in an aside, "I know that our good brethren, the negroes of Texas,
will now rejoice that they possess at the primary the rights which heretofore they have
enjoyed at the general election." Comment, Nixon v. Condon-Disfranchisement of the
Negro in Texas, 41 YALE L.J. 1212, 1216 & n.27 (1932) (relying on unnamed person pres-
ent at Court when opinion was read). Holmes was both aware of and sensitive to the
racial situation in the South, as is evident in his correspondence with Harold Laski.
See 2 HOLmES-LAsKI LETTERs 964, 974, 975, 1265 (M. Howe ed. 1953) (letters of July 23,
Aug. 24, and Sept. 1, 1927, and July 10, 1930). His statement about Herndon, though
characteristically enigmatic, seems to indicate that Holmes did not believe that the vote
would materially alter that situation.
323. 286 U.S. 73 (1932).
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authority to make the actions of the party committee into state ac-
tion. Justice Cardozo, writing for a bare majority of the Court, held
for the plaintiffs, but in doing so spun a distinction so fine as to invite
further legislation. Cardozo argued that the inherent power to define
membership qualifications in a political party rested with the party's
state convention. By altering the source of authority within the party,
the state had delegated power to the executive committee and made
its actions into state action. The membership qualifications therefore
violated the Fourteenth Amendment. 24 As in Herndon, the Court
did not reach the Fifteenth Amendment question. McReynolds, joined
by Van Devanter, Sutherland, and Butler, dissented.
325
The state convention of the Texas Democratic Party then passed
its own resolution prohibiting nonwhite participation in primary
elections, and the issue returned to the Court. In Grovey v. Town-
send,3 20 the Court unanimously held that the exclusion was not state
action and therefore not subject to the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amend-
ments. The opinion, written by Roberts, reasoned that the Democratic
Party primary was a private affair because the party paid for the elec-
tion and provided, counted, and returned the ballots.327 Roberts re-
jected the argument that exclusion from the Democratic primary was
the equivalent of disenfranchisement in Texas, stating that such an
argument confused the "privilege of membership in a party with the
right to vote."3
28
It would be too simple to assume that the members of the Court
were altogether insensitive to racial issues at the time of the Grovey
decision. 329 On the contrary, there were indications that the Court
was beginning to take cognizance of the inequities of the criminal
justice system in the South.330 But in the area of party politics, the
324. Id. at 84-89.
325. Id. at 89. Commentators were also skeptical about Cardozo's distinction, but
differed with regard to the implications of his reasoning. Most agreed that the issue
would return to the Court. See, e.g., Evans, Primary Elections and the Constitution, 32
MicH. L. REv. 451, 461-62 (1934) (offering four choices of reasoning "[w]hen the Supreme
Court faces again the issue"); Note, The White Primary in Texas Since Nixon v. Condon,
46 HARv. L. REv. 812, 818 (1933) (predicting that Court would continue to uphold claims
of blacks to vote in primary elections); Comment, sufpra note 322, at 1220-21 (predicting
that next case would take Cardozo's reasoning to logical conclusion and exclude blacks
from primary elections).
326. 295 US. 45 (1935).
327. Id. at 50.
328. Id. at 55.
329. McReynolds reportedly had racist inclinations. F. RODELL, NINE MEN 252 (1955).
Both Herndon and Grovey, however, were unanimous decisions.
330. Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935), decided by a unanimous Court without
McReynolds' participation during the same year as Grovey, reversed the convictions of
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Court was more concerned with the need to protect the private politi-
cal sphere from government intrusion. A passage from McReynolds'
Condon dissent illustrates this concern:
Political parties are fruits of voluntary action. Where there is no
unlawful purpose, citizens may create them at will and limit their
membership as seems wise. The State may not interfere. White
men may organize; blacks may do likewise. A woman's party may
exclude males. This much is essential to free government ....
[T]he Legislature [has] refrained from interference with the es-
sential liberty of party associations and recognized their general
power to define membership therein.331
These sentiments were echoed in Grovey. The Court's apprehension
was stated explicitly in Roberts' opinion: "We are not prepared to
hold that in Texas the state convention of a party has become a mere
instrumentality or agency for expressing the voice or will of the
state.1332 A holding that the Democratic Party's acts were state action,
the analysis the Court was asked to use to eliminate the white pri-
mary, would in one sense nationalize political parties. It would ren-
der the Democratic Party, and political parties generally, subject to
both the judicially enforceable restrictions on state action contained
in the Constitution and the power of the federal government to pass
legislation to implement these restrictions. This outcome was rejected
by a Court already hostile to government intervention in the private
economic sector.333
B. United States v. Classic: The Prosecution
These Supreme Court decisions, limiting federal power to redress
corruption and discrimination in the electoral process, formed the
background for the Department of Justice's prosecution in United
States v. Classic. The prosecution was part of the Department's activ-
ist program in support of civil liberties . 4 The case arose in Louisiana,
where irregularities in the political process had given rise to federal
prosecutorial activity on several previous occasions.335
one of the Scottsboro Boys on the ground that blacks had been systematically excluded
from juries. Id. at 589-99. Justice Sutherland, one of the Condon dissenters, had written
the opinion in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), reversing earlier convictions in
the same case because the right to counsel had been denied. Id. at 69-73.
331. 286 U.S. 73, 104, 105 (1932).
332. 295 U.S. 45, 54 (1935) (emphasis added).
333. See generally A. MASON, suPra note 32, at 384-426.
334. See pp. 780-84 supra.
335. In response to Long's growing national appeal, in 1935 the federal government
withheld funds for Louisiana projects and initiated federal prosecutions of prominent
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1. The Indictment
As in other Southern states, Louisiana politics during this period
were the politics of the Democratic Party. In 1940 the Democratic
primary was a fight between the Long machine and the balance of
the party. The anti-Longs, led by Sam Houston Jones, were con-
sidered the reform candidates, although they had the support of the
corrupt New Orleans machine known as the Ring.33 6 The activities
of the Ring in support of one reform candidate for Congress, T. Hale
Boggs, gave rise to the Classic prosecution. Operatives of the machine,
selected as Commissioners of Election in accordance with Louisiana
law, conducted the runoff primary in New Orleans on September
10, 1940. They seized ballots cast for the other candidates and marked
them as cast for Boggs. The tampering did not affect the outcome of
the election; the actual vote gave Boggs 426 votes to 94 for the Long
candidate and 17 for an unaffiliated candidate.337 In response to pres-
sure from the defeated Long faction, the local United States Attorney,
Rene Viosca, filed an indictment against the Ring workers under
Sections 19 and 20 just two weeks after the election. Only after he
had filed the indictment did Viosca notify the Department of Justice
of his action, writing, "In view of the recurring demands in this state
that the Federal Government do something about these election mat-
ters, I believe that this test case should be brought to a conclusion
in order that we may definitely know the extent of Federal juris-
diction." 38
Although the prosecution seems to have been initiated simply as
an attack on electoral irregularities, 339 the implications for the white
Long aides for tax fraud. A. SINDLFR, supra note 62, at 86. These actions ceased in 1935,
after Long's assassination, amid rumors of an agreement between the Roosevelt admin-
istration and Louisiana politicians said to have pledged support for the administration.
A. SINDLER, supra note 62, at 126-28. A number of scandals erupted in 1939 when wide-
spread corruption in state government was exposed. State prosecutions were not forth-
coming, however, because prosecutors and judges owed their positions to the Long ma-
chine. The federal government intervened. Rogge traveled to Louisiana to direct a series
of prosecutions under federal tax, mail fraud, and "hot oil" statutes. R. CARR, supra note
193, at 86; A. SINDLER, supra note 62, at 137-40; Interview with 0. John Rogge, supra note
251. In a press release directed primarily at the Long machine, Rogge threatened to prose-
cute any electoral misconduct in the 1940 primaries under the mail fraud and civil rights
statutes. A. SINDLER, supra note 62, at 146; Interview with 0. John Rogge, supra note 251.
After the first primary election in 1940, he initiated a prosecution under Section 20 against
a police officer charged with assaulting a photographer at a polling place. See p. 782
& note 265 supra.
336. A. SINDLER, supra note 62, at 162-63.
337. Transcript of Record at 3-4, United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
338. R. CARR, supra note 193, at 86.
339. Id.
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primary3 40 were immediately understood in Washington. After a
period of uncertainty, Attorney General Robert Jackson agreed to go
through with the prosecution, apparently believing that it could be
used to reverse Newberry.34' Francis Biddle, then Solicitor General,
later wrote that the case was brought in order to undermine the
immunity of the white primary from federal control. Biddle also
specifically noted that no blacks were involved,342 a fact that minimized
the political damage the case would cause among Roosevelt's Southern
supporters. At the same time, recalls Biddle's assistant, Herbert Wechs-
ler, in fashioning the arguments the Justice Department attorneys con-
sidered the implications for fighting political corruption as well as
for eliminating the white primary.
343
As expected, the district court sustained a demurrer to the indict-
ment, citing Newberry for the proposition that Congress had no power
to control primaries and concluding that the Constitution did not se-
cure the right to vote in a primary.344 The appeal went directly to
the Supreme Court, where it was briefed by Wechsler and James E.
Doyle, and argued by the former, filling in for an ailing Biddle.345
2. The Justice Department's Brief
The Department's brief offered two grounds for upholding federal
intervention in what had hitherto been considered the private affairs
of political parties: Article I, Section 2, of the Constitution, and the
340. See p. 796 infra.
341. R. CARie, supra note 193, at 86-87. Carr based his assessment on examination of
the file for Classic at the Department of Justice and on interviews in 1945 with 0. John
Rogge and Hugh A. Fisher. Id. at 86 n.3 & 87 n.4. The Department of Justice has been
unable to locate the Classic file in response to the author's request under the Freedom
of Information Act.
342. F. BIDDLE, supra note 262, at 159. This view. of Classic is supported by Biddle's
account of the way he justified to Roosevelt the Department's decision not to become
involved in the direct attack on the white primary in Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649
(1944). Roosevelt had asked Biddle about the possibility of an amicus brief in the case,
noting that there had been "a good deal of a howl" about the Department's refusal to
do so. Biddle wrote of his response:
I told him that the "howl" came from Walter White of the National Association for
the Advancement of Colored People . . . that we had established the right to vote
in primaries as a federal right enforceable in the federal courts in the Classic case,
and that, if we intervened here again, the South would not understand why we were
continually taking sides.
F. BIDDLE, supra note 262, at 187.
343. Letter from Herbert Wechsler to author (Nov. 5, 1980); Interview with Herbert
Wechsler, supra note 266. In addition, articles written about Classic by members of the
Department soon after it was decided cited its implications for the white primary. Folsom,
Federal Elections and the "White Primary". 43 COLUM. L. REv. 1026, 1029-35 (1943);
Rotnem-Clarifications, supra note 262, at 256-57; Rotnem, supra note 280, at 23.
344. Transcript of Record at 18, 21, United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
345. F. BIDDLE, supra note 262, at 159; Letter from Herbert Wechsler to author, supra
note 343.
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equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Both argu-
ments carried the potential for sweeping extensions of federal law
enforcement power.
The brief opened by citing the precedents holding that Article I,
Section 2,846 secured the right of a qualified voter to have his vote
counted as cast in a general congressional election. Unlike the rights
guaranteed by the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, the gov-
ernment argued, this right was protected against private as well as
state infringement. Relying on the text of Article I, Section 2, the
government characterized the guarantee as the "right... to choose."
347
Tampering with ballots in the Louisiana Democratic primary elec-
tion impaired the right to choose for two reasons. First, the primary
election was, by law, an "integral part" of the election because all
political parties were required by Louisiana statute to nominate their
candidates for Congress in a primary.3 48 Second, the Democratic pri-
mary in Louisiana was, as a matter of "unbroken practice," the de-
terminative part of the election process. The government cited sta-
tistics demonstrating that the winner of the Democratic primary for
Congress was almost invariably the eventual winner. The brief argued
that the right to choose therefore must extend at least to the Demo-
cratic primary. 49 "Article I, Section 2," the government stated, "is
concerned with realities, not with forms."3 50
The government's contention that Article I, Section 2, guaranteed
the "right to choose" laid the foundation for the development of rights
beyond the specific facts of Classic. If taken to its logical conclusion,
the government's argument could provide constitutional protection
against private parties as well as government officials for all the activ-
ities important in the process of electing representatives, including
freedom of speech, assembly, press, and travel. Latent in the "right
to choose" was precisely the expansion of federal constitutional rights
enforceable against private persons paraded as a list of horribles by
McReynolds in Newberry.851
346. Article I, Section 2, Clause 1, of the Constitution provides: "The House of Rep-
resentatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of
the several States, and the Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications requisite
for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature."
347. Brief for the United States at 16-17, United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
This characterization was important because the wronged voters had been permitted to
cast ballots.
348. Id. at 18-22. In addition, a candidate defeated in the primary was legally pre-
cluded from running in the general election. Id. at 19-22.
349. Id. at 22-24.
350. Id. at 27.
351. See p. 788 supra (quoting McReynolds' opinion).
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The Department also argued for the first time on appeal that the
defendants hid violated the constitutional right to equal protection
of the laws. As Election Commissioners selected from party ranks in
accordance with state statute, the defendants were said to be state
officers and their action, although contrary to state law, to be state
action. 352 Broadening the scope of state action to include such po-
litical operatives had significant potential for expanding federal pro-
tection of the conduct of elections. The defendants had deprived
those voting for the losing candidates of equal protection, the gov-
ernment argued, by willfully failing to count their votes while count-
ing votes cast for another candidate. Equal protection was not limited
to racially motivated, continuous, or statutorily ordained discrimina-
tion. A single instance was sufficient, so long as the discrimination
was "conscious and deliberate" 35 3 This definition of a violation of
equal protection carried the potential for converting almost any ar-
bitrary state treatment into a federal crime and dramatically expand-
ing the reach of federal law enforcement power in the area of civil
liberties.
Both angles of the government's argument had ominous implica-
tions for the survival of the white primary. First, by contending that
party operatives who had been delegated the power to run elections
were state officials, the government necessarily implied that they were
subject to the equal protection clause and thus to the holding in
Herndon. Second, the government's other argument bypassed alto-
gether the state action morass of the Herndon-Condon-Grovey trilogy
by deriving an Article I, Section 2, right that was protected against
all comers so long as the voter was qualified under state law. The
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, in turn, ensured that such
state law qualifications could not be drawn on racial lines. As a re-
sult, state action would no longer be a necessary component of chal-
lenges to the white primary.
Although both arguments would accomplish the same result in Clas-
sic, they represented quite different approaches to the general goal
of increasing federal protection for individuals and to the specific
aim of outlawing the white primary. Expanding the realm of state
action provided more comprehensive protection, including state as
well as federal elections, but only at the cost of nationalizing a part
of the private political arena. The other approach, protection via
Article I, Section 2, provided a narrower scope of constitutional pro-
352. Brief for the United States at 37, United States v. Classic, 313 U.s. 299 (1941).
353. Id. at 38-39.
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tection, confined to the goal of ensuring that all qualified voters were
allowed to vote in a primary for federal office in order to enjoy their
"right to choose." More generally, the state action approach applied
existing rights to a new set of actors, while the Article I, Section 2,
approach, although narrow, entailed the elaboration of a new con-
stitutional right. The next section explores the way in which the
different approaches appealed to the different concerns of the various
Justices. It is a tribute to the ingenuity of the Department that the
desired result in Classic could be obtained through an argument that
contained the essential elements of either analysis.
C. United States v. Classic: The Decision
Classic was argued on April 7, 1941, and considered in conference
on April 12. During the argument, Roberts had pressed Wechsler on
whether the government's argument would not also sanction federal
regulation of the nominating conventions of political parties. 54 Doug-
las' handwritten notes show that Roberts also expressed doubts during
the conference deliberations:
Stone would reverse-Roberts bothered by Herndon v. Lowry-
If we reverse, says Roberts, & Congress passed law saying negro
democrats were excluded from primary & that they should not be,
we would have to sustain the law-In Herndon state controlled
all aspects of primary-Stone says in Herndon however defeated
candidate could get on ballot-so that difference can be utilized
here- 3 55
Douglas also recorded the vote.356 Despite his doubts, Roberts joined
Murphy, Douglas, Frankfurter, Reed, and Stone in voting for reversal.
Black and Hughes357 passed, and McReynolds did not participate.
There were no dissenters.
354. Interview with Herbert Wechsler, supra note 266.
355. Douglas, Handwritten Conference Notes, No. 618 (Apr. 12, 1941) (William 0.
Douglas Papers, Box 56, Library of Congress). Douglas, or Roberts, probably meant Nixon
v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927), the first white primary case, rather than Herndon v.
Lowry, 501 U.S. 242 (1937), a case overturning the conviction of a black organizer for
the Communist Party for violating a Georgia sedition statute. The confusion may have
arisen from the racial overtones of Lowry. See id. at 275-76 (Van Devanter, J., dissenting)
(in deciding whether circumstances created "probable effect" of insurrection, court could
consider that blacks would "give unusual credence to [the] inflaming and inciting fea-
tures" of speech).
356. Record of Vote, No. 618 (William 0. Douglas Papers, Box 56, Library of Congress).
357. Hughes had argued Newberry, see pp. 788-89 supra, before the Supreme Court
and had later become embroiled in controversy because he denounced Newberry's con-
viction as a "miscarriage of justice." 1 M. PUSEY, CHARLES EVANS HUGHES 389-91 (1951).
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1. Stone's Initial Formulation
Stone produced a draft opinion within two weeks.358 He adopted
much of the Justice Department's reasoning regarding Article I, Sec-
tion 2,359 and declined to reach the equal protection argument. 6 0
Louisiana primaries, Stone wrote, were an integral part of the gen-
eral election. Not only did Louisiana pay for primaries and regulate
their time, place, and manner, but more significantly, only successful
primary candidates were permitted to run for Congress in the general
election. In addition, Stone accepted the government's contention that
the Democratic primary in Louisiana was invariably dispositive of
the general election.3 61
Stone also agreed with the government that the "right to choose,"
secured by Article I, Section 2, against private as well as state action,
included not only the right to vote in the general election,3 62 but also
the right to vote in a primary election if it was an integral part of the
procedure of choice or in fact controlled the outcome.3 63 "[T]he free
choice by the people of representatives in Congress ...was one of
the great purposes of our Constitutional scheme of government," Stone
declared. The "integrity" of that choice was guaranteed by the Con-
stitution regardless of whether the election occurred in one or two
steps.3 6
4
For the same reasons, Congress, under its Article I, Section 4, power
to regulate the time, place, and manner of elections, had the authority
to regulate primaries that were either an integral part of the electoral
process or dispositive of the eventual outcome. 6 5 Newberry was there-
He steadfastly refused to take part in the Classic decision. Note on galley proof, Charles
Evans Hughes to Harlan F. Stone, No. 618 (undated) (Harlan Fiske Stone Papers, Box 66,
Library of Congress); Note from Harlan F. Stone to Charles Evans Hughes, No. 618 (May
10, 1941) (Harlan Fiske Stone Papers, Box 66, Library of Congress); Interview with Herbert
Wechsler, supra note 266.
358. Stone Draft Opinion, No. 618 (undated) (Harlan Fiske Stone Papers, Box 66,
Library of Congress). The location of the draft in the file suggests that it must have
been circulated by April 24.
359. Id. at 6-11.
360. Id. at 14.
861. Id. at 4-7.
362. Id. at 7.
363. Id. at 9-10. As Stone pointed out in an explanatory note to Douglas, a primary's
actual effect had to be accorded significance because the state statutes remained subject
to the interpretation of the state supreme court, which could interpret the statutes dif-
ferently and eliminate the "integral" status of the primary. But if neither condition was
satisfied, the primary did not affect the right to choose representatives in Congress. Note
from Harlan F. Stone to William 0. Douglas (Apr. 29, 1941) (Harlan Fiske Stone Papers,
Box 74, Library of Congress).
364. Stone Draft Opinion, supra note 358, at 8.
365. Id. at 8-11.
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fore overruled. To hold otherwise, Stone continued, would leave Con-
gress "powerless to effect the constitutional purpose."8066 Stone also
found that the "necessary and proper clause" gave Congress the power
to regulate primary elections.36 7
Sections 19 and 20, protecting the right to vote in primary elec-
tions, were an exercise of that congressional authority. United States
v. Mosley368 had held that a conspiracy to prevent the counting of a
ballot in a general election was a crime under Section 19; Stone rea-
soned that the section also prohibited a conspiracy to deny the same
right in a primary election.3 69 Furthermore, because the defendants
were acting under color of state law in counting ballots, recording
the count, and certifying the result, their actions were "under color
of law" and violated Section 20.370 Finally, Stone held that the race,
color, or alienage provision of Section 20 applied only to the prohi-
bition against discriminatory punishments.3 "7
2. The Emergence of Dissent
Comments from the Justices returned to Stone with the circulated
drafts. Frankfurter returned his copy with the note, "I am deeply
pleased by this. A fine job-really-without breaking eggs." 37 2 Reed
adhered to his vote, and Roberts remained persuaded that he un-
derstood, writing that he found the opinion "clear and convincing."3 73
Signs that the decision would not be unanimous appeared along
with the praise. Douglas, in particular, was disturbed by the draft.
For him, the question of whether a primary in a particular state was
in fact tantamount to a final election was irrelevant to the question
of whether the Constitution gave Congress the power to regulate a
366. Id. at 10.
367. Id.
368. 238 U.S. 383 (1915).
369. Stone Draft Opinion, supra note 358, at 11.
370. Id. at 11-12. In a memorandum sent out on April 24, amending his circulated draft,
he addressed the point that the defendants had acted in derogation of state law: "Misuse
of power, possessed only because of state law and made possible only because the wrong-
doer is clothed with the authority of state law. is action taken 'under color of' state law."
Stone Memorandum, No. 618 (Apr. 24, 1941) (Harlan Fiske Stone Papers, Box 66, Library
of Congress). By defining state action as the delegation of state power under statute, Stone
apparently excluded unregulated "private" primaries from the scope of Section 20.
371. Stone Draft Opinion, supra note 358, at 12.
372. Note on page 14 of galley proof, Felix Frankfurter to Harlan F. Stone, No. 618
(undated) (Harlan Fiske Stone Papers, Box 66, Library of Congress).
373. Note on page 14 of galley proof, Owen Roberts to Harlan F. Stone, No. 618
(undated) (Harlan Fiske Stone Papers, Box 66, Library of Congress). But see p. 805 infra
(Roberts' subsequent insistence that Classic did not undermine Grovey).
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primary.374 After a meeting with Stone, an exchange of letters,375
and an attempt to write a concurrence,3786 Douglas' doubts hardened
into certainties and he decided to dissent.
In his dissent, which he elaborated in successive drafts, 377 Douglas
agreed that Newberry should be overruled because Article I, Section
4, gave Congress "ample power" to regulate primary elections. 378 How-
ever, in the absence of legislation specifically governing, conduct in
primaries, he disagreed as to the application of Sections 19 and 20.
He argued that the principles of criminal law and federal criminal
jurisdiction required that a federal offense be "plainly and unmis-
takably" within the language of a statute. "Civil liberties," he in-
sisted, "are too dear to permit conviction for crimes which are only
implied and which can be spelled out only by adding inference to
inference."379 Section 19, he concluded, was not intended to apply to
primaries.380 Finally, Stone's use of the criterion of a primary's ac-
tual impact further confirmed Douglas' conviction that Section 19 was
fatally vague if applied to primaries. The question of whether acts
such as the defendants' violated Section 19 would in some cases de-
pend on a subsequent judicial inquiry into the significance of a par-
ticular primary. For criminal liability to hinge on such a procedure
violated "the strict standards necessary for the interpretation of a
criminal law" and demonstrated that the Court was improperly per-
forming a legislative function. 881
In a passage added to a subsequent draft dissent, Douglas addressed
Stone's argument based on the "right to choose" under Article I, Sec-
tion 2. "[F]or purposes of the criminal law as contrasted to the inter-
pretation of the Constitution as the source of the implied power of
Congress," Douglas wrote, Article I, Sections 2 and 4, in the absence
374. Note from William 0. Douglas to Harlan F. Stone, No. 618 (Apr. 24, 1941) (Harlan
Fiske Stone Papers, Box 66, Library of Congress).
375. Id.; Note from Harlan F. Stone to William 0. Douglas, supra note 363.
376. Douglas Draft Concurring Opinion (typewritten), No. 618 (William 0. Douglas
Papers, Box 56, Library of Congress). Two notes attached to the draft indicate that it
was never used, but that a copy was sent to Black.
377. Douglas Draft Dissent (typewritten), No. 618 (probably Apr. 29, 1941) (William
0. Douglas Papers, Box 56, Library of Congress); Douglas Draft Dissent, No. 618 (May
2, 1941) (William 0. Douglas Papers, Box 56, Library of Congress) [hereinafter cited as
Douglas May 2 Dissent]; Douglas Draft Dissent, No. 618 (May 7, 1941) (William 0.
Douglas Papers, Box 56, Library of Congress) [hereinafter cited as Douglas May 7 Dissent];
Douglas Draft Dissent, No. 618 (May 9, 1941) (William 0. Douglas Papers, Box 56,
Library of Congress) [hereinafter cited as Douglas May 9 Dissent]. The May 9 dissent
was the first to be circulated, although a note attached to the May 2 dissent indicates
that the latter draft was sent to Black and Murphy.
378. Douglas May 2 Dissent, supra note 377, at 1.
379. Id. at 2.
380. Id. at 4-5.
381. Id. at 5-6.
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of any specific legislation by Congress, did not protect the primary
election or the nominating convention.38 2 Although, as the Yarbrough
and Mosley cases had held,3 3 these sections protected the right to vote
and the right to have one's vote counted at the general election,
Douglas insisted that "they certainly do not per se extend to all acts
which in their indirect or incidental effect restrain, restrict, or inter-
fere with that choice."38 4 Section 19, which extended only to those
rights "plainly and directly guaranteed by the Constitution," 38 5 there-
fore could not reach the defendants' conduct in Classic. Thus, al-
though Douglas interpreted Article I, Section 4, broadly to give Con-
gress the power to regulate primaries, he apparently rejected Stone's
central proposition that Article I, Section 2, was a self-executing guar-
antee of the right to choose in primary elections.380 Despite Douglas'
somewhat ambiguous phrasing, his disagreement with the majority
opinion seems to have had its roots in constitutional interpretation
as well as statutory construction.
Stone responded to the dissent with another draft seeking to re-
fute Douglas' apparent conclusion that there was no constitutional
right to vote in any primary election. He emphasized the Court's re-
sponsibility to construe the Constitution to take account of political
reality:
It is hardly the performance of the judicial function to con-
strue a statute, which in terms protects a right . . . to choose a
representative in Congress, as applying to an election whose only
function is to ratify a choice already made at the primary and as
having no application to the primary which is the only effective
means of choice.38 7
Formalities aside, Stone argued that the defendants' acts were "plain-
ly within the statute" because they were an "obviously effective" in-
terference with the right to choose. 88
382. Douglas May 7 Dissent, supra note 377, at S.
383. See p. 787 supra.
384. Douglas May 7 Dissent, supra note 377, at 3-4.
385. Id. at 4.
386. Douglas never stated flatly that Article I, Section 2, did not guarantee the right
to vote in a primary. Indeed, his insistence on adhering to strict standards of interpre-
tation for criminal laws and his stress on the absence of congressional legislation would
be consistent with a belief that the rights "secured ... by the Constitution" within the
meaning of Section 19 were narrower than the rights constitutionally guaranteed for
other purposes. However, Douglas never explicitly made such a clarification, which
would have made his argument considerably easier to comprehend and would have per-
mitted civil enforcement of an Article I, Section 2, right to vote in primary elections.
387. Stone Draft Opinion at 13, No. 618 (May 10, 1941) (Harlan Fiske Stone Papers,
Box 66, Library of Congress).
388. Id.
The Yale Law Journal
Douglas continued work on the dissent. On May 19, he inserted a
rider into the draft that seemed to distinguish the case before the
Court from a federal prosecution directed against a white primary:
There can be put to one side cases where state election officials
deprive negro citizens of their right to vote at a general election
(Guinn v. United States.. .), or at a primary. Nixon v. Herndon
... Nixon v. Condon... Discrimination on the basis of race or
color is plainly outlawed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Since
the constitutional mandate is plain, there is no reason why § 19
or § 20 should not be applicable.88 9
On its face, the paragraph's references to earlier cases indicated only
that, in Douglas' view, racially based exclusions that could be chal-
lenged in a civil action in federal court were also made criminal by
Sections 19 or 20. If the paragraph was a more general attempt to
distinguish the white primary cases, then it failed to account for the
problem of the "private" primary, which had defeated the plaintiffs
in Grovey.390 Nevertheless, the passage appears to have been a very
significant addition to the opinion. It signaled Douglas' desire to show
that, despite his dissent in Classic, the white primary was not im-
mune from federal control even in the absence of new legislation.
Frankfurter was disturbed by the dissent. He wrote to Stone that
Douglas' opinion was one of those things that "one wishes one had
never seen." 83 9' Attempting to assist Stone in rebutting Douglas' at-
tempt to distinguish the white primary cases, he proposed a passage
that indicated that he understood Stone's argument imperfectly:
The Fourteenth Amendment by its prohibition of racial dis-
crimination meant to put all citizens of the United States on a
political equality. If interference with a Negro's right to partici-
pate in a primary is interference with a right secured by the
Constitution, the same interference against citizens who are not
Negroes must equally be an interference with the right secured
to all citizens by the Constitution.892
389. Douglas Handwritten Rider, No. 618 (May 19, 1941) (William 0. Douglas Papers,
Box 56, Library of Congress). Douglas apparently declined the suggestion of his law
clerk that he include a citation to the Fifteenth Amendment. Draft Dissent, "D.S."
Annotated Copy, No. 618 (May 20, 1941) (William 0. Douglas Papers, Box 56, Library
of Congress).
390. See p. 791 supra.
391. Note from Felix Frankfurter to Harlan F. Stone, No. 618 (May 21, 1941) (Harlan
Fiske Stone Papers, Box 66, Library of Congress).
392. Id.
802
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Like Douglas' amendment, this passage is hard to fathom. Herndon
had held that interference with a black's participation in a primary
was a denial of the right to equal protection of the laws, not of the
right to participate in a primary election. Yet Stone's opinion had not
reached the government's equal protection argument, relying instead
on the right to choose secured by Article I, Section 2. Frankfurter
was either confusing the two rights or suggesting that the equal pro-
tection argument be considered after all.393 Stone disregarded the
suggestion. 94
Douglas' dissenting opinion was joined by Black and Murphy. Mc-
Reynolds and Hughes395 did not participate. Two of the majority Jus-
tices-Roberts and Frankfurter-did not seem fully to understand the
basis of the majority opinion. Only Reed seemed to be entirely with
Stone, writing to the latter that he agreed "[e]veryday in everyway."3 96
Nevertheless, by a vote of four to three, the Court reversed the lower
court's decision to sustain the demurrer to the indictment. Stone un-
doubtedly breathed a sigh of relief when the decision was announced
on May 26 and Classic became law.3 97
3. Classic and the White Primary
Stone's opinion in Classic did not specifically refer to Grovey or to
the white primary. Nevertheless, the implications of Classic for South-
ern politics were almost universally appreciated by commentators after
the decision was announced.898 Moreover, if Douglas' notes399 are
an accurate record of the conference, it appears that the Court was
393. In the May 21 letter, Frankfurter took a position regarding equal protection that
differed from his concurrence in Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1944) (arbitrary
refusal by election official to certify primary nominee, illegal under state law, not a
denial of equal protection).
394. In response to Douglas' draft dissent, Stone added the argument that it was "no
extension of the criminal statute, as it was not of the civil statute in Nixon v. Herndon
• ..to find a violation of it in a new method of interference with the right which its
words protect." Stone Memorandum, No. 618 (May 22, 1941) (Harlan Fiske Stone Papers,
Box 66, Library of Congress).
395. Wechsler recalls that either Stone or Frankfurter told him that Hughes thought
that Classic was correctly decided. Interview with Herbert Wechsler, supra note 266.
396. Note from Stanley Reed to Harlan F. Stone (undated), on back of Stone Mem-
orandum, supra note 394.
397. Despite the defection of the dissenters, Stone was apparently pleased with his
opinion. Letter from Harlan F. Stone to Sterling Carr (June 5, 1941) (Harlan Fiske Stone
Papers, Box 9, Library of Congress).
398. See, e.g., Folsom, supra note 343, at 1029-35; Lusky, supra note 114, at 16 n.46;
Rotnem-Clarifications, supra note 262, at 256-57: Rotnem, supra note 280, at 23; 41
COLUM. L. REV. 1101, 1103 (1941); 4 LA. L. Rnv. 133, 136-37 (1941); 20 N.C. L. Rav. 93,
96 n.15 (1941).
399. See p. 797 supra (reporting Roberts' concerns about Herndon).
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alerted from the beginning that the future of the white primary was
connected to the outcome of the case.
Stone appears clearly to have understood these implications. Soon
after the decision in Smith v. Allwright" ° declaring white primaries
unconstitutional, he wrote that he had believed Grovey to be doomed
when he wrote the Classic opinion.40 1 Stone's opinion in Classic also
cites a source used in the government's brief,40 2 an article on Suffrage
in the South appearing in 1940 in Survey Graphic that strongly criti-
cized the Grovey decision for ratifying the disenfranchisement of
blacks.403 In addition, three days after the conference on Classic, Stone
wrote to Judge Moore praising a recent article by Moore.40 4 The
article had concluded with an attack on the disenfranchisement of
blacks by deliberate and ingenious legislation, "the constitutionality
of which has been upheld by our courts." 405 Douglas, too, apparently
appreciated the effect the majority opinion would have upon the foun-
dations of Grovey. In his "Negro voter" paragraph 400 he attempted
to provide an alternative path to the goal of eliminating the exclusion
of Southern blacks from the franchise.
Other Justices, however, seem to have perceived no necessary con-
nection between Classic and the demise of the white primary. Roberts,
author of the Court's opinion in Grovey, believed that Classic had
left the white primary untouched. He seems to have been satisfied
by Stone's distinction of Herndon at the conference. Stone relied on
Louisiana law, which made the primary an integral part of the elec-
tion by confining the general election to winners of primaries.40 7 But
400. 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
401. Note from Harlan F. Stone to Stanley Reed (Apr. 5, 1944) (Harlan Fiske Stone
Papers, Box 76, Library of Congress).
402. 313 U.S. 299, 314 n.2 (1941) (one of three sources for "discussion of the practical
effect of the primary in controlling or restricting election of candidates at general elec-
tions"); see Brief for the United States at 23 n.9, United States v. Classic, 313 U.S.
299 (1941).
403. Stoney, Suffrage in the South, 29 SURVEY GRAPHIC 163, 164 (1940).
404. Letter from Harlan F. Stone to John B. Moore (Apr. 15, 1941) (Harlan Fiske
Stone Papers, Box 22, Library of Congress).
405. Moore, What of the Night, 17 VA. Q. REv. 75, 88 (1941). The passage stated:
We prate of race equality and this we do while excluding from the United States,
with very limited exceptions, various classes of aliens, and particularly the Chinese
and Japanese, not as individuals but on grounds of race; nor do I hear from any
quarter, either from our professed philanthropists or from politicians, practical or
otherwise, any proposal that this discrimination shall be abolished. In reality race
equality, especially in the sense of equal representation, is deliberately and ingeniously
denied in much of our legislation, the constitutionality of which has been upheld
by our courts.
This passage is strikingly similar to a paragraph in an earlier letter from Moore to Stone.
See p. 763 supra (quoting from letter).
406. See p. 802 supra (quoting paragraph).
407. See p. 797 supra (reporting Stone's argument at conference).
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he did not address the fact that, in both Herndon and Classic, the
Democratic primary was in practice dispositive of the outcome and
thus implicated the constitutional right to choose. Accepting Stone's
inadequate but plausible explanation, Roberts was made party to the
effective overruling of his own opinion in Grovey. Dissenting strongly
three years later in Allwright, he objected to the majority's sugges-
tion that Classic had undermined Grovey: "I[n] fairness, it should
rather have adopted the open and frank way of saying what it was
doing than, after the event, characterize its past action as overruling
Grovey v. Townsend, though those less sapient never realized the
fact." 408
Frankfurter may have recognized the logical inconsistency of Classic
with Grovey,40 9 but during the rancor surrounding the drafting of the
opinion in Allwright, he insisted that the Court in Classic had been
"careful to withhold" any inferences regarding Grovey and had done
nothing to undermine its continued vitality.410 Reed, while he was
laboring with the white primary issue as author of the majority opinion
in Allwright, believed that resolution of the problem was aided by
Classic, but apparently did not view it as completely dispositive.411
D. Division Within the Consensus
The Court in Classic was divided on three general issues, along
lines that did not always follow the split between the majority and
minority. First, the Justices disagreed as to the Court's responsibility
for initiating remedial action in the two areas implicated in Classic:
the integrity of the political process and the protection of minorities.
Second, the Court was divided as to the appropriate means to redress
the exclusion of blacks from participation in the political process.
Third, the Justices differed about the proper resolution of the con-
408. 321 U.S. 649, 670 (1944); see A. MASON, supra note 32, at 616-17.
409. See p. 802 supra (quoting Frankfurter's suggested addition to opinion in Classic).
410. Note from Felix Frankfurter to Harlan F. Stone (Mar. 18, 1944) (Harlan F.
Stone Papers, Box 74, Library of Congress). Frankfurter disagreed strongly with the
manner in which Reed was approaching the problem of overruling Grovey in Smith v.
Allwright. He believed that the tone of Reed's opinion in Allwright was too placatory and
equivocal, and he argued for a strong statement acknowledging that the Court had
simply been wrong in Grovey. He disputed Reed's claim that Grovey had been whittled
away over time and denied that Classic had done anything to undermine its strength.
Id.; Note from Felix Frankfurter to Harlan F. Stone (Mar. 17, 1944) (Harlan Fiske Stone
Papers, Box 74, Library of Congress).
411. Reed "reread and reflected upon Cruikshank, the Slaughter House, Civil Rights
Cases, Classic, Berea, and Gong Lum" and concluded that "[t]he Texas primary case
will take a little of all of them for its settlement." Letter from Stanley Reed to Felix
Frankfurter (July 6, 1943) (Felix Frankfurter Papers, Box 92, File 1922, Library of Congress).
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flict between individual rights and the affirmative measures neces-
sary to protect the democratic process. These three questions were
inescapable corollaries of the new ideology. Divisions on the Court
resulted from the difficulties of implementing the new commitment
to protect democracy from the excesses of the majority.
412
1. The Role of the Court
With regard to the role of the Court, Stone's opinion was clearly
the progeny of footnote four of Carolene Products.4 13 In Classic, Stone
reaffirmed his belief that the Court had primary responsibility to use
the Constitution to protect the political process414 and ensure the par-
ticipation of minorities in that process. The white primary, which
Stone apparently viewed as a target of the Classic opinion,41 5 epit-
omized the fusion of democratic dysfunction and racism. In some re-
spects, it was the incarnation of the very sort of tyranny outlined by
Lippmann, Thompson, and others. Stone was unwilling to leave the
systematic exclusion of blacks from political participation to Con-
gress for resolution. Presumably he did not expect that the party that
profited from the white primary and dominated the Congress to take
the steps necessary to rectify the situation. His view that the Court
was the only branch of government with the resolve and the tools to
take the necessary affirmative action found expression in Classic.
Roberts apparently joined the majority in Classic because he shared
Stone's belief that the Court was ultimately responsible for providing
affirmative protection to the democratic process. In Hague v. CIQ, 41 6
he had similarly accepted judicial intervention to curb politically mo-
tivated suppression of speech. But his opinion in Grovey, the fears
he voiced at the Classic conference, and his later dissent in Allwright417
together demonstrate that Roberts did not believe that group oppres-
sion justified judicial intervention into the private political sphere.
Roberts focused exclusively on protecting the mechanisms of the po-
litical process; for him, Grovey was still the law.
Frankfurter also differed from Stone regarding the proper role of
the Court. He agreed that the Court should be the ultimate pro-
412. See note 242 supra (split decisions by Court on civil liberties cases).
413. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); see notes 145 & 147 supra (quoting second and third
paragraphs).
414. S. KONEFSKY, CHIEF JUSTICE STONE AND THE SUPREME COURT 215 (1945).
415. See p. 804 supra.
416. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
417. 321 US. 649, 666 (1944) (Roberts, J., dissenting).
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tector of the political process, but did not share Stone's belief that
the Court should protect minorities against the results of that pro-
cess. 418 Nevertheless, unlike Roberts, Frankfurter did not view the
protection of minorities and the protection of the political process as
separate issues. For Frankfurter, judicial protection of the integrity
of the democratic process necessarily involved vigorous efforts to en-
sure that racial discrimination did not exclude any group from that
process. As he wrote to Stone, he believed that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment was intended primarily to ensure political equality.419 In con-
trast to the deference to the legislature that he voiced in Gobitis,
420
Frankfurter acknowledged in Classic the judiciary's prerogative in the
area where the integrity of the democratic process and the oppression
of minorities clearly intersected.
The dissenters in Classic-Douglas, Black, and Murphy-reflected the
New Deal's hostility to judicial review in their insistence that Con-
gress was the branch of government with the power and responsibility
to protect the political process. The white primary issue, however,
renders problematic their position with regard to the responsibility
of the Court. The dissenting opinion strongly implies that, having
acknowledged Congress' power to regulate primaries, the dissenters had
relegated the future of the white primary to Congress. But the polit-
ical realities of 1941 made it highly implausible to expect a Demo-
cratic Congress to abolish the white primary by exercising its powers
under Article I, Section 4. Less than three years after Classic, all three
dissenters joined the Court in striking down the white primary in
A llwright.
It is difficult to believe that Murphy, given his preoccupation with
"intolerance," would be party to any prolongation of the white pri-
mary. Murphy did not formally join the Classic dissent until May
23;421 he may have believed that Douglas' "Negro voter" amendment
of May 19422 had successfully distinguished the white primary prob-
lem. Similarly, Douglas and Black presumably believed that the rider,
which suggested that the exclusion of blacks from primary elections
violated Sections 19 and 20, provided a satisfactory justification for
judicial relief. Thus, the dissenters seem to have assigned primary
418. See p. 770 supra.
419. Note from Felix Frankfurter to Harlan F. Stone, supra note 391.
420. Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 597-600 (1940); see p. 769 supra.
421. Note from Frank Murphy to William 0. Douglas, No. 618 (May 23, 1941) (William
0. Douglas Papers, Box 56, Library of Congress).
422. See p. 802 supra (quoting paragraph).
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responsibility to the Court for abolishing the white primary while
keeping Congress as the primary guardian of the political process. 423
2. The Methodology of Judicial Intervention
Most of the Justices, including the three dissenters in Classic, thus
seemed to concede that the Court had ultimate responsibility for
taking action to ensure black participation in the electoral process.
In its brief, the Department of Justice had given the Court two pos-
sible doctrinal avenues for attacking the white primary. First, the
Court could find that the right to vote in a primary was secured by
Article I, Section 2. Second, it could hold that the actions of the
defendants were state action, subject to the restrictions of the Four-
teenth Amendment. The Justices did not agree on which avenue was
more appropriate.
Stone's opinion in Classic did not choose between the two approach-
es.424 His concern that the holding in Classic be independent of Lou-
isiana law suggests that he placed primary reliance on the Article I,
Section 2, approach. Moreover, Stone was unlikely to be enthusiastic
about the movement towards the nationalization of political parties
entailed by the state action approach; 42 5 he disapproved of the con-
centration of power in the federal government and the hegemony of
the Democratic Party. On the other hand, the Article I, Section 2,
analysis applied only to federal elections and would thus not eradicate
the white primary. To be satisfied, Stone would somehow have to
integrate the two approaches; Classic could not be the last word for him.
The "Negro voter" amendment in Douglas' dissent does not set
forth the reasoning underlying the conclusion that white primaries
are unconstitutional. The reference to the Fourteenth Amendment
suggests, however, that Douglas had implicitly adopted a state action
approach rather than relying on Article I, Section 2. An intention
to rely on state action in future white primary cases may help to
425. That Douglas made such a distinction is supported by his dissent in United States
v. Saylor, 322 U.S. 385, 590 (1944) (Douglas J., dissenting), announced a month after Douglas
had joined the majority in Allwright in holding that the primary was state action under
the Fifteenth Amendment. In Saylor, joined by Black and Reed, Douglas restated his
position in Classic that most electoral corruption did not violate a federal right until
Congress had expressly made it a federal offense. Id. at 392.
424. 313 U.S. 299, 318-19 (1941) (Article I, Section 2, protects "right to choose"); id.
at 325-26 (violation of voters' rights by election officials was "state action"). Stone declined
to pass on the equal protection argument because his finding on Article I, Section 2,
made it unnecessary and because the issue had not been raised in district court. Id. at 329.
425. Cf. Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 520 n.1 (1939) (Stone, J.) (privileges and immuni-
ties clause to be narrowly construed to prevent excessive congressional and judicial re-
striction of state action).
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explain Douglas' puzzling failure to challenge the use of Section 20,
which extended only to action "under color of law,' 426 to support
the indictments. 427 The dissenters, supporters of the New Deal, proba-
bly did not share Stone's unease about the expansion of public power
over political parties. Finding state action would subject political
parties to existing constitutional obligations rather than allow the
courts to create new ones.
To use the state action approach successfully to eliminate the white
primary, however, the dissenters would have to move beyond Stone's
definition of state action, for purposes of Section 20, as the actual
delegation of power under state statute.428 If they did not do so, their
position would be vulnerable to obstructionist efforts to withdraw
all state involvement in white primaries.429 Moreover, varying de-
grees of limited state involvement would create line-drawing diffi-
culties. As the Court's handling of Nixon v. Condon made clear,430
the state action determination could be as vague and troublesome as
the classification of primaries required by Stone's Article I, Section
2, approach. The dissenters could ensure that their state action ap-
proach would be both effective and free from the vagueness problem
they had attacked in Classic only by adopting a flat rule that all party
primary elections were state action regardless of the actual extent of
state involvement. Such a rule would imply a new theory of state ac-
tion that encompassed the performance of public functions similar
to those conducted by the state.
There is no direct evidence that the dissenters contemplated this
theory of state action at the time of Classic, but the theory would pro-
vide a basis for eliminating the white primary without accepting Stone's
analysis. An inclusive rule about primaries would also be consistent
with Douglas' acknowledgment that Congress could regulate all pri-
mary elections, regardless of the degree of state involvement in the
primary or the primary's effect on the general election. It may be
no accident that in 1946 Black was the author of Marsh v. Alabama,431
426. See note 281 supra (quoting Section 20).
427. Section 20 is briefly mentioned in the "Negro voter" amendment, 313 U.S. at
332 (Douglas, J., dissenting), and in an inconsequential footnote, id. at 332 n.1.
428. See note 370 supra.
429. Some Southern Democrats later attempted unsuccessfully to evade the mandate
of Allwright by eliminating all state involvement in primary elections. See Elmore v.
Rice, 72 F. Supp. 516 (E.D.S.C.), affl'd, 165 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S.
875 (1948); Brown v. Baskin, 78 F. Supp. 933 (E.D.S.C. 1948), afrd, 174 F.2d 391 (4th Cir.
1949); Davis v. Schnell, 81 F. Supp. 872 (S.D. Ala.), afrd, 336 U.S. 933 (1949); V. KEY,
supra note 316, at 625-43.
430. See pp. 790-91 & note 325 supra.
431. 326 U.S. 501 (1946). But see Snowiss, supra note 214, at 243 (Black's rejection of
expanded concepts of state action in racial discrimination cases in 1960s).
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the first clear exposition of the public function theory of state action,
and it is significant that a version of the public function theory was
used to condemn the white primary in Allwright and the "private"
primary in Terry v. Adams.
4
32
3. Individual Rights and the Maintenance of Free Government
The last area of fundamental disagreement in Classic concerned
the proper balance between individual rights and the government's
exercise of power to protect minorities and the political process. From
the narrow perspective of criminal procedure, Douglas' dissent in
Classic was probably correct. Prosecution under undeniably vague
and antiquated Reconstruction statutes, one of which had apparently
been used only four times since its enactment, for insignificant ballot
tampering in a minor election was at lest a dubious exercise of pros-
ecutorial discretion. Indeed, Stone himself had previously aired simi-
lar views about the danger of prosecutions under vague federal
statutes. 433
Nevertheless, it is not surprising that Stone would be unmoved
by the defendants' claim of foul. He took a more utilitarian view of
the need to protect civil liberties than Douglas, and recognized the
need to protect democracy from the dangers of unrestrained majori-
tarianism. 434 The result in Classic was also consistent with Frankfurt-
er's willingness to countenance stern measures against perceived threats
to the democratic process.
On the other hand, Douglas justified the protection of civil liber-
ties in absolute terms and for their own sake; civil liberties were
"too dear" to permit anything less than strict standards for the con-
struction of criminal statutes.485 This stance was entirely consistent
with his repeated insistence on the protection of the individual, the
"smallest minority," as the repository of the values necessary for the
survival of democracy. Murphy, who joined the dissent, also attached
great importance to the rights of individuals. Yet, although Douglas
insisted on protecting individual civil liberties, he was apparently
willing to subject political parties to all the restrictions of the Four-
teenth Amendment in order to protect the interests of blacks. The
dissenting opinion seems to value individual rights and collective
432. 345 U.S. 461, 468-70 (1953) (Black, J.); id. at 484 (Clark, J., concurring).
433. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 74-75 (1941) (Stone, J., dissenting).
434. Compare p. 764 supra (Stone's view that civil liberties preserve proper func-
tioning of political process) with p. 777 supra (Douglas' view that individual freedoms
deserve absolute protection, not simply means to political ends).
435. 313 U.S. 299, 332 (1941) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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rights differently, cherishing individual freedom, but accepting in-
creased government regulation over private organizational structures.
4. Fundamental Agreement and the Rule of Law
The three areas of disagreement show that the Court's new con-
sensus about the subversive power of racist politics was not auto-
matically translated into judicial decisions. Members of the Court
were beginning to appreciate that manipulation of the majority's ir-
rational fears and hatreds posed a grave threat to the survival of de-
mocracy. The Justices all agreed that the passive mentality of New-
berry was obsolete, and it is striking that scarcely six years after Grovey
no Justice invoked the dangers of government intrusion into the pri-
vate political sphere. Once the Court moved beyond complete ex-
clusion of the federal government from this arena, dissension arose
with regard to the precise nature of the threat facing democracy and
the proper means and institutions for dealing with that threat. The
Court's choice was either to take judicial action or to find constitu-
tional justification for legislative intervention.
The creativity of the Department of Justice also contributed to
the cleavage on the Court. Seeking the translation into law of the
new consensus regarding the threat of unrestrained, racially motivated
majoritarianism, the Department gave the Court two possible approach-
es to affirmative federal action. In the end, the fundamental difference
between the majority, asserting a self-executing right under Article
I, Section 2, and the dissent, favoring the development of a broader
notion of state action, reflected the two alternatives presented by
the government. This divergence was constructive; it kept the con-
tent of the emerging legal principles flexible and thus facilitated the
ongoing process of developing an affirmative federal program against
group hatred and the persecution of minorities.
In sum, the substantive content of the Court's reorientation made
possible, and perhaps inevitable, the dissension that appeared in Classic.
There was no single means of implementing the consensus that racist
politics posed a threat to democracy and required government action.
Despite their differences, however, Stone and Douglas were writing
about the same problem and were aiming ultimately at the same re-
sult. It is appropriate that Douglas' opinion was first written as a
concurrence; both opinions grew out of a perception of politics and
democracy that differs radically from the perception underlying New-
berry and Grovey.
In Classic, the Court's new ideology appears in two ways, in the
The Yale Law Journal
holding and in the broader implications for government regulation
of private activity. The Court held that private political primaries, in-
cluding the white primary, could be brought under government con-
trol. But the Court in Classic did more than give the government
permission to proceed with its case. It also signaled that a wider range
of social conduct, including conduct by hitherto private parties, would
be held subject to the immutable rule of law embodied in the Con-
stitution. Just as the concept that tyranny was the betrayal of the
people by corrupt leaders gave way to the paradigm of hysterical ma-
joritarianism, so too the old notion that the Constitution protected
persons only against the government was replaced in Classic by a view
that the Constitution protected minorities against the majority, re-
gardless of whether the government was directly involved. Alexander
Pekelis, writing a few years after Classic, described the concept of con-
stitutional protection against "private governments" that appears in
Stone's opinion as a "huge reservoir of new constitutional power"
that opened "breath-taking constitutional vistas." 48 6
E. The Aftermath: Smith v. Allwright
The effect of Classic on the white primary was, as Pritchett has de-
scribed it, similar to that of a "delayed-action bomb."437 The impli-
cations of Classic were widely understood in the legal community im-
mediately after the decision was announced. 488 Thurgood Marshall
and William Hastie of the NAACP, recognizing the opportunity, ar-
ranged for the dismissal of a pending appeal challenging the white
primary and brought a new suit, Smith v. Allwright,439 based on the
reasoning in Classic.440 Biddle and Wechsler at the Justice Depart-
ment declined to join the direct attack on the white primary, both
because they had sought to convince the Court in Classic that Grovey
could be distinguished, and because their involvement would create
problems with the conservative Senate Judiciary Committee.441
Allwright created even sharper disputes within the Court than
Classic had caused. Jackson and Black joined Roberts in voting to
affirm the demurrer in the first conference vote. According to Murphy's
conference notes, Jackson was particularly disturbed about the com-
436. A. PEKELIS, LAW AND SOCIAL ACTION 113 (1950).
437. C. ParrcHrr, supra note 1, at 123.
438. See note 398 supra.
439. 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (attack on Texas white primary scheme upheld in Grovey).
440. Marshall, The Rise and Collapse of the "White Democratic Primary", 26 J.
NEGRo EDUC. 249, 252-53 (1957).
441. R. KLuGER, supra note 165, at 234; see note 342 supra.
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peting right to form groups, and both Jackson and Rutledge were
concerned about the general implications of judicial supervision of
state elections.442 Still more dissension followed Stone's assignment of
the Court's opinion to Frankfurter. In an extraordinary display of
political sensitivity, Jackson prevailed upon Stone to reassign the opin-
ion because Frankfurter was Jewish, from New England, and gen-
erally viewed as unsympathetic to the Southern wing of the Democratic
Party.4 43 The task of gracefully overruling Grovey, a precedent only
nine years old, was given to Reed.
Rather than being graceful, Reed's opinion was an awkward com-
bination of the reasoning of Stone's opinion in Classic and the state
action approach latent in the Classic dissent. Reed acknowledged that
the only material difference between Grovey and Allwright was that
the Classic decision had intervened. Apparently ignoring Classic's
emphasis on the dispositiveness of the primary, Reed did not men-
tion Article I, Section 2, or the "right to choose." Classic, Reed pro-
claimed, had fused the primary and general elections into "a single in-
strumentality" for choosing officials. The "unitary character of the
electoral process" recognized in Classic did not by itself bestow "state
action" status upon the exclusion of blacks from the primary, but it
created the possibility that state delegation to a party of the power
to exclude persons from a primary election might make the party's
action into state action.4 44 Reed seemed to assert that a state action
finding depended on the state's statutory involvement in primary elec-
tions and emphasized that Texas legislation had rendered the primary
an integral part of the general election. Therefore, he concluded, the
statutory delegation to the Texas Democratic Party of the authority
to determine the qualifications of primary voters-which in Grovey
had not generated a state action finding-was state action within the
meaning of the Fifteenth Amendment.
4 45
While Reed's opinion won the support of Jackson and Black, it
drew strong criticism from Frankfurter, who believed that Reed was
too concerned about "appeasement." 446 For Frankfurter, a "compelling
regard for the Constitution as a dynamic scheme of government" justi-
fied a frank reversal of Grovey.447 The Fourteenth and Fifteenth
442. J. HowAR, supra note 179, at 356.
443. A. MAsoN, supra note 32, at 614-15.
444. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 660 (1944).
445. Id. at 664.
446. Note from Felix Frankfurter to Harlan F. Stone (Mar. 17, 1944) (Harlan Fiske
Stone Papers, Box 74, Library of Congress) (attaching draft concurrence).
447. Id.
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Amendments, he wrote in a memorandum circulated in response to
Reed's draft, were violated whenever "free access to the electoral pro-
cess" was denied on the basis of race, regardless of how "attenuated
the relation of the machinery of the State to the machinery of the
party may be" or "by whatever political mechanism the result is
achieved." As "trustees" of the principles of those amendments, Frank-
furter continued, the Court had the duty of assuring "equality of par-
ticipation in the political processes by which the nation is governed."448
Accordingly, Frankfurter concurred separately without opinion.
The decision, fulfilling the implicit promise of Classic, effectively
destroyed the white primary.449 Although several Southern states at-
tempted various devices to evade the decision, these efforts were con-
sistently rebuffed by lower federal courts450 and, much later, by the
Court itself in Terry v. Adams. 451 Faced with legislation purporting
to withdraw all state involvement from primary elections, the lower
courts were not impeded by the intricacies of the Court's opinion in
A llwright and struck down the exclusion of blacks from Democratic
primary elections regardless of the state's involvement.452
Conclusion
The Classic decision exemplifies the change in the Court's orien-
tation in the decade from 1935 to 1945. The formalism of the Court's
election law decisions during the preceding period was founded on
resistance to government interference with activities in the private
political sphere. In the 1930s, the emergence of fascism in Europe and
political developments at home generated a new concern that de-
mocracy could not depend for its survival on the self-executing pro-
tections built into the democratic process. Emphasizing the danger
that unrestrained majorities posed to minorities and to the preserva-
tion of free, .democratic government, the new perception of politics
recognized that democracy was particularly vulnerable to the exploi-
tation of racism for political ends. This analysis generated an emerg-
448. Id. Frankfurter sent his suggestions to Stone first, and circulated them to the
other Justices the following day. Note from Felix Frankfurter to Harlan F. Stone (Mar. 18,
1944) (Harlan Fiske Stone Papers, Box 74, Library of Congress).
449. The decision in AUwright was followed by a significant, though not universal,
increase in the level of black voting in the South. P. WATTERS & R. CLEGHORN, CUMBING
JACOB'S LADDER 26-31 (1967).
450. See note 429 supra.
451. 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
452. See, e.g., Elmore v. Rice, 72 F. Supp. 516, 526-28 (E.D.S.C.), affd, 165 F.2d 387
(4th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 875 (1948).
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ing consensus that the Constitution must be construed to provide
greater protection for democracy against the corrosive force of racism
in both the public and private spheres.
Classic also demonstrates the difficulty of translating this new
understanding into judicial protection of the electoral process. Al-
though the Justices had begun to absorb contemporary ideology con-
cerning the weaknesses of democracy, they could not agree on the
specific legal measures that should follow from their new consensus.
Yet these difficulties did not necessarily represent a poverty of theory
or, as Pritchett would describe it, a weakness of liberalism.453 Rather,
the disagreements represented the growing pains of a new body of legal
doctrine based on a fundamental shift in perception. The impetus
behind Classic contributed in later cases to the process of ending le-
gally sanctioned racial inequality in America. Taken on its own terms,
Classic remains a remarkable statement by a Court coming to terms
with new and desperate political realities.
453. C. Pmcnrrr, supra note 1, at 264-67.
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